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ABBREVIATIONS
CBD = Convention on Biological Diversity
CBDR = Common but Differentiated Responsibilities
CCB = Climate, Community, and Biodiversity Alliance
CDCF = Community Development Carbon Fund
CDM = Clean Development Mechanism
CEDAW = Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
Against Women
CER = Certified Emissions Reduction
CERD = Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion
COP = Conference of Parties
CRC = Convention on the Rights of the Child
DNA = Designated National Authority
EIA = Environmental Impact Assessment
GHG = Greenhouse Gas
ICCPR = International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESC = International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
IEL = International Environmental Law
IHRL = International Human Rights Law
1IF = International Financial Institution
ITTO = International Timber Trade Organization
KP = Kyoto Protocol
LULUCF = Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry Land Use, Land-Use
Change and Forestry
MDGs = Millennium Development Goals
MEA = Multilateral Environmental Agreement
MNE = Multinational Enterprise
NGO = Nongovernmental Organization
PDD = Project Design Document
REDD = Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation
UNFCCC = United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
T. INTRODUCTION
OVERVIEW OF THE ARTICLE
Northern citizens, governments, and businesses are investing billions of
dollars in the vast, imperiled forests of the South.' In a forest carbon project, a
1. I use "North" to refer to developed or industrialized nations. Northern nations have been primarily
responsible for creating the problems of global climate change through pollution associated with industrializa-
tion; as we will see below, in section IV.A.2: Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR), Northern
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developer plants trees to reforest a degraded ecosystem or preserves a forest that
would have otherwise been degraded or felled. The developer can then sell the
carbon, now sequestered in the trees and underground biomass, for a contracted
period of time.2
Forest carbon projects are legally problematic. In this article, I will first
introduce the elements of forest carbon projects and the legal debates they
engender. I introduce the notion of "deep equity," the concept that provides an
aegis for my analysis. I then briefly describe the entwined problems of global
climate change and deforestation. I review the legal regime formulated to
ameliorate these problems. I explain forest carbon schemes under both interna-
tional treaties and the voluntary market. I then examine principles of equity,
drawn from multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), customary interna-
tional environmental law (ILEL), and international human rights law (IHRL)
obligations that are implicated in forest carbon investments. After introducing
each right or principle, I explain how forest carbon projects may or may not
advance the right and propose a set of standards for what an ideal project-one
that maximizes deep equity-would include. I briefly analyze how international
law is currently ill-equipped to regulate these projects, as many of the important
actors elude legal control, in part because they are not explicitly named as duty
bearers or because neither home nor host countries are able or willing to enforce
legal requirements that do exist. I conclude by discussing how international law
should be reformed so that forest carbon investments cleave to legal standards
that promote genuine adaptation through deep equity, i.e. sustainable individual,
community, and ecological health and potential.
FOREST CARBON PROJECTS: A SOLUTION TO ALL PROBLEMS, OR A PROBLEM THAT
ELUDES ALL SOLUTIONS?
Forest carbon projects help mitigate global climate change when they store
more carbon than would be emitted by the polluting activities they enable. Such
projects may also help communities adapt. Climate change endangers survival of
many species in forest ecosystems and threatens to impair how those ecosystems
function.3 Intact forests provide ecological resiliency for human communities:
they help communities prosper because they buffer floods, filter drinking water,
stabilize soil, prevent drought, harbor pollinators, provide food, medicine, and
building products, and preserve countless other ecosystem services necessary for
nations are thus the only nations with binding greenhouse gas reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol.
"Southern" nations are those in the process of development; Southern nations are least responsible for creating
global climate change, yet will suffer the most from its consequences.
2. See DAvID TAKACS, FOREST CARBON: LAW + PROPERTY RIGHTs 14 (Conservation International 2009)
(providing details of various property arrangements for forest carbon).
3. Charlotte Streck, et al., Climate Change and Forestry: An Introduction, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FoRESTS:
EMERGING PoLIcY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIS 55 (Charlotte Streck, et al., eds., 2008).
2010]
THE GEORGETOWN INT'L ENVTL. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:521
human survival.4
Forest carbon investments may also foment socioeconomic climate change
adaptation through new sources of income (from carbon credits or employment),
new forestry-related skills,5 ancillary project benefits (e.g., project developers
building schools or clinics), or clear land title.6 They may assist with institutional
adaptation by helping develop skills and institutions so that communities or
nations can more effectively decide development priorities, negotiate effectively
with project developers, or develop and manage their own forest carbon projects.7
Despite all of these potential benefits, critics claim that forest carbon invest-
ments do little to mitigate global climate change and are instead anti-democratic,
human rights-impairing schemes that allow the already rich to profit at the
expense of the poor. Skeptics paint lose-lose situations, as Northern consumers
assuage guilty consciences over profligate lifestyles while corporations mine
profits from a scheme supposedly meant to save the planet, but actually
sustaining hydrocarbon-based capitalism as usual. Critics allege that poorly
planned forest carbon projects in the South may bar poor people from traditional
land, leading them to lose money, become refugees, or starve.8
4. I am not referring to preserving functioning ecosystems and their component species for their own sake;
while this is ethical and desirable, and is the subject of other MEAs, it is not the focus of the legal climate
regime. UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMME, REDUCING EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION: A KEY
OPPORTUNITY FOR ATrAINING MULTIPLE BENEFITS, 9-10 (2007) (prepared by Valerie Kapos, Peter Herkenrath &
Lera Miles) [Hereinafter REDUCING EMISSIONS]; Stefano Pagiola, et al., Market-based Mechanisms for Forest
Conservation and Development in SELLING FOREST ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES: MARKET-BASED MECHANISMS
FOR CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT 2 (Stefano Pagiola et al., eds. 2002); See CERSPA, GUIDANCE
DOCUMENT (2009), available at http://www.cerspa.org; David Freestone, Foreword, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND
FORESTS: EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES et al., supra note 3 at xii.
5. Richard Tipper, Helping Indigenous Farmers to Participate in the International Market for Carbon
Services: The Case of Scolel Td, in SELLING FOREST ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES: MARKET-BASED MECHANISMS
FOR FOREST CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 4, at 232.
6. Carina Bracer et al., Organization and Governance for Fostering Pro-Poor Compensation for Environmen-
tal Services: CES Scoping Study Issue Paper no. 4, ICRAF Working Paper no. 39, 35 (World Agroforestry
Centre 2007); See Brian Walsh, Getting Credit for Saving Trees, TIME, July 23, 2007; Alfred Ofosu-Ahenkorah,
CDM Participation and Credit Pricing in Africa, in EQUAL EXCHANGE: DETERMINING A FAIR PRICE FOR CARBON
133 (Glenn Hodes & Sami Kamel, eds., 2007); THE KATOOMEA GROUP, GETTING STARTED: AN INTRODUCTORY
PRIMER TO ASSESSING AND DEVELOPING PAYMENTS FOR ECOSYSTEM SERVICE DEALS 10 (2008); See WILLIAM D.
SUNDERLIN, ET AL., FROM EXCLUSION TO OWNERSHIP? CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN ADVANCING FOREST
TENURE REFORM 29-30 (Rights and Resources Initiative 2008); See LORENzo CoTULA & JAMES MAYERS, TENURE
IN REDD: START-POINT OR AFERTHOUGHT? 3-4 (IED 2009); Julian Quan with Nat Dyer, Climate Change and
Land Tenure: The Implications of Climate Change for Land Tenure and Land Policy 36 (lIED and Natural
Resources Institute, University of Greenwich, Land Tenure Working Paper 2 2008).
7. Patricia Nelson, An African Dimension to the Clean Development Mechanism: Finding a Path to
Sustainable Development in the Energy Sector, 32 DENY. J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y 615, 623 (2004); Ofosu-
Ahenkorah, supra note 6, at 133.
8. One 2009 review cites 144 REDD initiatives underway: COTULA & MAYERS, supra note 6, at 1; DLYS ROE
ET AL., CLIMATE, CARBON, CONSERVATION, AND COMMUNrrIES: AN IIED/WWF BRIEFING 1 (2007), available at
http://www.iied.org/pubs/pdfs/17011IED.pdf.; LARRY LOHMANN, CARBON TRADING: A CRITICAL CONVERSA-
TION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, PRIVATISATION, AND POWER 230-33 (2006); TOM GRwFrHS, SEEING "REDD"?
"AVOmED DEFORESTATION" AND THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND LOCAL COMMUNTIES 14, available at
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Though decried by critics, a coalition of businesspeople, international financial
institutions (Is), Northern and Southern government leaders, environmental
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and pro-poor NGOs have joined forces
to promote forest carbon projects.9 At the international level, projects that
reforest land or that reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation
(REDD) will likely be expanded if negotiators succeed in formulating a post-
2012 successor to the Kyoto Protocol (KP) as part of the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) or similar instrument that allows Northern nations to offset
required emissions reductions by investing in sustainable development projects
in the South. ° The recent Conference of Parties to the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) agreed on tittle else but the
need to increase efforts to invest in forest carbon, and Northern nations have
pledged US$3.5 billion to help Southern nations build capacity in REDD.1 At
the federal level, pending legislation in the U.S. Congress would impose
greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction goals, and allow forest carbon offsets as a
means to meet those goals. 12 And at the state level, California's landmark Global
Warming Solutions Act will allow 49% of the required emissions to be offset and
forest carbon will likely be an attractive option. 13 The governors of California,
Wisconsin, and Illinois have signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the
governors of four Brazilian states and two Indonesian provinces to cooperate on
forest carbon projects.1 4 The voluntary market in forest offsets is booming,
becoming a multibillion-dollar enterprise.
http://www.forestpeoples.org/documents/ifi-igo/avoided-deforestation-red-jun07-eng.pdf; http://www.
forestpeoples.org/documents/ifi-igo/avoided-deforestation-red-jun07_eng.pdf; DAVID HUMPHREYS, LOGJAM:
DEFORESTATION AND THE CRISIS OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 208 (2006); FERN, Climate Change: the Forest
Connection, http://www.fern.org/campaign-area.html?id=6 (last visited Feb. 1,2010).
9. James Kanter, In London's Financial World, Carbon Trading is the Next Big Thing, N.Y. TIMES, July 6,
2007.
10. Peter C. Gelling and Andrew Revkin, Delegates in Balifor Talks on Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2,
2007; Peter Gelling, Forest Loss in Sumatra Becomes a Global Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6,2007, atA14. CoTuLA
& MAYERS, supra note 6, at 2.
11. See, e.g., Copenhagen Accord, Decision -/CP.15, Dec. 18, 2009, available at http://unfccc.int/files/
meetings/cop_15/application/pdf/copl5__cph-auv.pdf; Ad Hoc Working Group on Long Term Cooperative
Action Under The Framework Convention on Climate Change, Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working
Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention, Addendum, Draft Decision -/CP. 15, Copenha-
gen, Denmark, Dec. 15, 2009, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/awglca8/engll07aO6.pdf; Alyssa
Moir, "There Must be a Pony in here Somewhere: Progress in Copenhagen on Reducing Emissions From
Deforestation, MARTENS LAW GROUP, Dec. 23, 2009, available at http://www.martenlaw.com/news/?20091223-
emissions-from-deforestation; Maria Bendana, What Does Copenhagen Mean for the Private Sector in
.REDD-plus, FOREST CARBON PORTAL Jan. 4, 2010, available at http://www.forestcarbonportal.com/
article.php?item= 1243.
12. American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454 §§ 751-756 (2009).
13. CALwORIA AnR REsouRcEs BOARD (CARB), CLIMATE CHANGE PROPOSED SCOPn G PLAN 57 (2008).
14. Press Release, Gov. Schwarzenegger Partners with Other States to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions
from Deforestation (Nov. 18 2008), available at http://gov.ca.gov/press-releasell 1101/.
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Deep Equity and Forest Carbon Projects
Forest carbon projects seem ineluctable. Thus the more cogent question
becomes: how might we maximize their potential to help communities adapt to
the ravages of global climate change? Herein I describe what might be done to
ensure that forest carbon investments live up to their potential of promoting a
deeply equitable world. By "deep equity," I mean values, actions, and laws
promoting sustainable pathways that act in synergy to maximize the health and
potential of all individuals, communities, and ecosystems. The equity is deep
because it asks that values become. rooted within each individual. It is also deep
because it requires that we fundamentally re-imagine our community structures
and responsibilities, and entrench and encode these values and responsibilities in
our legal systems and policy choices. Our laws and policies would, in turn,
support values and actions promoting even deeper equity.
Deep equity is my umbrella term for all of the principles I discuss in this
article. When using forest carbon projects as a means of adaptation, deep equity
means simultaneously promoting individual, community, and ecosystem health
in present and future generations. 15 It requires distributive justice to promote
such equity. 16 It recognizes that past injustices have lead to present inequity-
between North and South, between elites and non-elites within a nation, and
between indigenous and non-indigenous groups-and thus state and private
entities have a common but differentiated responsibility to advance equity.
17
Deep equity recognizes that human rights must be respected, protected, and
fulfilled if individuals and communities are to maximize their potential. 18 It
requires that concerned citizens participate in environmental decision-making,
and that nonhuman species and ecosystems have proxies who speak for their
interests.19 It recognizes that indigenous groups have often been treated inequita-
bly even within Southern nations and require special treatment to ensure
justice. 20 Deep equity requires that states and private actors minimize and
mitigate their pollution, so that all individuals, communities, and ecosystems
may thrive.21
Herein I develop a legal framework for forest project proponents who wish to
promote deeply equitable adaptation. The framework simultaneously respects the
rule of law while promoting basic dignity for those who risk finding themselves
15. See, e.g., infra section on Sustainable Development, at § IV.A.3.
16. See, e.g., infra sections on Sustainable Development and Common but Differentiated Responsibilities, at
§§ IV.A.3 and § IV.A.2.
17. See, e.g., infra sections on Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Indigenous Peoples' Rights,
at §§ IV.A.2 and IV.B.4.
18. See, e.g., infra sections on Human Rights, including Environmental Human Rights, at § I.B.
19. See, e.g., infra sections on Environmental Democracy, Sustainable Development, and Indigenous
People's Rights, at §§ IV.A.5, IV.A.3, and IV.B.4.
20. See, e.g., infra section on Indigenous Peoples' Rights, at IV.B.4.
21. See, e.g., infra section on Preventative and Polluter Pays Principles, at IV.A.4.
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on the losing end both of the ravages of and solutions to global climate change.
For those interested in a deeply equitable world, IHRL provides one set of
analytical tools through which to examine, develop, and enforce the legal and
ethical obligations of forest carbon project actors. Principles of IEL-both
encoded in treaties and statutes, and emerging through custom-also cover areas
of equity that impose legal and ethical obligations on actors. I use these principles
to examine what project participants must and should do. In the final sections, I
analyze why both home countries of project developers, and host countries of
projects, may decline to police these investments, and how international law
might change to regulate forest carbon so that its deep equity potential may be
maximized.
The deep equity legal standards I propose here serve at least three purposes.
First, where international treaty law and domestic positive law are unambiguous,
I analyze what is legally required of all forest carbon actors. I take the position
that projects that do not meet most or all of these standards should be discouraged
or reformulated and those that meet these standards should be promoted. Second,
because treaty law lacks enforcement teeth, because domestic law may fail when
faced with powerful international actors, and because customary principals of
LEL often lie in unsettled legal gray areas,2 2 I offer a set of best practices and
principles of deep equity for government leaders, community members, and
project developers who wish to develop forest carbon adaptation projects that
cleave to the most capacious reading of international law, and thus choose to
maximize human rights and equity. Even where law does not unambiguously
require adherence to certain principles, they are nonetheless available for those
who would err on the side of protecting the most vulnerable.
Third, I offer guidelines for project developers who want to develop forest
carbon projects that are maximally sustainable because they help communities
adapt. Sustainable forest carbon projects are: "1) effective, i.e., they work
without complication and deliver and maintain desired carbon benefits over the
long term; 2) synergistic, i.e., they maximize benefits for all communities,
biodiversity, climate, and investors; and 3) equitable, i.e., gaps between rich and
poor narrow" as a result of the project. 23 While some reforms I promote here are
costly, I believe carbon marketed from these projects would fetch premium prices
precisely because buyers wish to invest in projects that respect, protect, and fulfill
human rights and deepen equity, rather than exacerbate inequity. Furthermore,
providing alternate means of livelihood to forest-dependent people means greater
local buy-in-and thus greater stability, and greater profitability for all actors. 24 I
hope that the forest carbon market eventually embraces the principles I name here
22. For example, private actors developing projects have unclear status as duty bearers in international law;
both home and host countries may have ambiguous legal requirements.
23. For a fuller explanation, see TAKAcs, supra note 2, at 11.
24. SuNDERuN et al., supra note 6, at 37.
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as legal requirements.
Forest Carbon and the Problem(s) of International Law
Forest carbon schemes reveal lacunae where neither domestic law nor interna-
tional law protect the most vulnerable, and where actors may believe they bear no
legal duties and face no legal liability for potentially human rights-violating,
equity-impairing acts. Law may fail to protect the most marginalized human and
nonhuman communities from the triple threat of 1) global climate change, 2)
deforestation, and 3) those who would profit economically from growing concern
over these scourges. 25 Currently, forest carbon projects float in legal IHRL and
TEL limbo. International meetings may allude to "principles of equity and
fairness" 2 6 that must be respected, but do not detail what these are, nor how these
principles are to be observed, nor hint that legal obligations may already define
these principles. Advocates call for "social impact assessments" or "minimum
standards" for "stakeholder consultation," but fail to name precisely what they
mean.27 The emerging set of competing voluntary standards urge compliance
with national laws but do not reference international legal principles. I have yet to
find a set of standards that acknowledges IHRL or TEL obligations; certain
standards do not even mention the climate change treaties. Even when some of
the best-intentioned efforts to advocate pro-poor forest carbon investments (or
other schemes to pay for environmental services) mention law, they may refer
only to the domestic contract or property law of the host nation.28 These
advocates overlook that international law often constrains or names what govern-
ments or individuals may do.
Forest carbon projects highlight international law's preoccupation with the
state as duty bearer, whereas private actors, IFIs, or NGOs may have a greater
impact on human rights and equity, for better or worse. These projects illustrate
the difficulties of regulating actions that take place across territorial boundaries,
actions that seem to elude both international and domestic law (whether of host or
home state). By examining the ways that international law could improve forest
carbon investments, I will point to ways these projects could help international
law evolve to promote greater equity in all legal arenas.
25. David Takacs, Carbon Into Gold: Forest Carbon Offsets, Climate Change Adaptation, and International
Law, 15 HASTINGS W-NW J. ENVTL L. & POL'Y 39, 84-87 (2009).
26. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological
Advice, Report on the second workshop on reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries, 44,
U.N. Doc. FCCC/SBSTA/2007/3 (May 18,2007).
27. See, e.g., CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL FORESTRY RESEARCH (CIFOR), INFOBRUF: MAKING FOREST
MARKETS WORK FOR LOW-INCOME PRODUCERS 2 (2002).
28. See, e.g., Bracer et al., supra note 6, at 35; Meine van Noordwijk, et al., Criteria and Indicators for
Environmental Service Compensation and Reward Mechanisms: Realistic, Voluntary, Conditional and Pro-




A. GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, TROPICAL DEFORESTATION, AND THE POOR
GHG pollution of the global atmospheric commons is a serious by-product of
industrialization. As GHGs amass in the atmosphere at alarming levels, scientists
predict dire consequences for human and nonhuman communities.2 9 Concerned
citizens and political leaders are responding to these alarms, pressing for
measures to mitigate the problem and to adapt to those changes that cannot be
prevented.
Forests store half the Earth's terrestrial carbon pool. 30 Forests are important
globally for their role in mitigating climate change. They are important locally for
adaptation to unpreventable climate changes. The Earth lost about 8.9 million
hectares of forest per year during the 1990s, and has lost about 7.3 million
hectares per year in the past decade, mostly in the tropics; such rates of
deforestation continue.31 Tropical deforestation accounts for about 17-20% of
GHG emissions.32 Deforestation from Indonesia and Brazil alone is equal to 80%
of the GHG emissions savings achieved if all nations with required emissions
reductions under the KP meet their targets in the 2008-2012 commitment
period.33
Climate change and deforestation hit the poor especially hard.3 4 Many poor
29. See, e.g., Joint Science Academies' Statement: Climate Change Adaptation and the Transition to a Low
Carbon Society, June 2008, available at http://www.nationalacademies.org/includes/climatechangestatement-
.pdf (statement posted by the National Science Academies of 13 nations, including those of the G-8); Tom Zeller
Jr., A High Cost to Deal with Climate Shift, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 30, 2009; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, Chairman's Vision Paper (AR5 Scoping Meeting, July 13-17 2009) available at http://www.ipcc.ch/
scoping-meeting.ar5/documents/doc02.pdf..
30. REDUCING EMIssIONS, supra note 6, at 4.
31. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, GLOBAL FOREST RESoURCEs AssEss-
MENT (2005); Pagiola et al., supra note 6, at 1; Robert O'Sullivan, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in
Developing Countries: An Introduction, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTs: EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET
OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 5, at 179.
32. See, REDUCING EMuSSIONS, supra note 6, at 4, (stating that deforestation is responsible for 18-25% of
GHG emissions); UNtrED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (UNDP), HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT
2007/2008: FIGHTING CLIMATE CHANGE: HUMAN SOLIDARITY IN A DIVIDED WORLD 41 (New York, 2007)
[hereinafter HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008] (stating that deforestation is responsible for 11-18% of
GHG emissions); COTULA & MAYERS, supra note 6, at v (stating that deforestation is responsible for 17% of
GHG emissions); H.R. 2454 supra note 12 at § 752(2) (stating that deforestation is responsible for 20% of GHG
emissions).
33. MArcio Santilli, et al., Tropical Deforestation and the Kyoto Protocol: A New Proposal 5 (COP-9, Milan,
Dec 1-12, 2003); HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008, supra note 31, at 42.
34. Nelson, supra note 7, at 615-16, 619; RODA VERHEYEN, CLIMATE CHANGE DAMAGE AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW: PREVENTION AND RESPONSIBILITY 34 (2005); M.J. Mace, Adaptation Under the UN Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change: The Legal Framework 48 (presented at Justice in Adaptation to Climate Change
Seminar, Zuckerman Institute for Connective Environmental Research University of East Anglia, Sept. 7-9,
2003); Andrew C. Revkin, Poor Nations to Bear Brunt as World Warms, N.Y. TIMES, April 1, 2007; KENNETH M.
CHoMrrz ET AL., AT LOGGERHEADS?: AGRICULTURAL EXPANSION, POVERTY REDUCTION, AND TROPICAL FORESTs
(2007); HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008, supra note 32, at 8.
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individuals, communities, and nations lack the economic, technical, political, and
institutional resources to adapt to deepening drought, crop pattern changes,
intensified storms, floods from melting glaciers, and rising sea levels. The
UNFCCC Art. 4.4 specifies that the "developed country Parties ... shall also
assist the developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the
adverse effects of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation to those adverse
effects."35 A deeply equitable world requires immediate action to mitigate GHG
emissions, and thus prevent climate change from widening gaps between rich and
poor; it requires that the rich help the poor adapt to the ravages that have already
been set in motion by climate change and cannot be stopped through mitigation.
B. THE GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE LEGAL REGIME
By signing the UNFCCC, the world's nations pledged to reduce their GHG
emissions in order to mitigate global climate change.36 The KP, ratified by all
developed nations except the United States, names the terms that legally bind
signatories. 37 Northern nations have been overwhelmingly responsible for anthro-
pogenic GHG accumulation, and their economic development has provided them
the financial and technological resources to act now to mitigate this pollution and
to help nations with fewer resources adapt. This notion of common but differenti-
ated responsibility (CBDR), which I will explain furtherin section IV.A.2, is an
underlying legal and ethical principle of the climate treaties. Between 2008 and
2012, Northern nations must decrease GHG emissions by at least 5% below 1990
levels.38 Under the KP, Southern nations have no required GHG reduction
targets, but nonetheless share common commitments to curb climate change.3 9
Northern nations can escape real reductions to emissions through a variety of
flexibility mechanisms. These are meant to be "supplemental" to "significant"
domestic actions, although the treaties' Conference of Parties (COP) has not
defined these terms.40 Northern nations may trade emissions credits among
35. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 4.4, art. 4.9, May 9, 1992, 1771
U.N.T.S. 107, 31 I.L.M. 849 (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994) [hereinafter UNFCCC]. Art 4.9 reiterates that
"The Parties shall take full account of the specific needs and special situations of the least developed countries in
their actions with regard to funding and transfer of technology."
36. Id.
37. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37
I.L.M. 22. The newly elected Prime Minister of Australia, Kevin Rudd, signed the Kyoto Protocol as his first act
of office on 3 December 2007, leaving the United States alone among the North in failing to ratify the KP.
Australian Leader Ratifies Kyoto Pact, Reuters, Dec. 3 2007, available at http://www.reuters.comlarticle
idUSSYD3784520071203.
38. Christopher Carr & Flavia Rosembuj, Flexible Mechanisms for Climate Change Compliance: Emission
Offset Purchases Under the Clean Development Mechanism, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 44, 46 (2008); Kevin
Baumert, Participation of Developing Countries in the International Climate Change Regime: Lessons for the
Future, 38 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 365, 373 (2006).
39. Baumert, supra note 40, at 381.
40. PHLmPE Cu.La, D'FERENTiAL TREATMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ENVmoNMENrAL LAw 117 (2003); United
[Vol. 22:521
FOREST CARBON OFFSETS
themselves, 41 or invest in CDM projects in the South.4 2 The CDM encourages
Northern nations to transfer clean technology and wealth to Southern nations to
help the latter develop sustainably, while allowing Northern nations to offset their
emissions requirements inexpensively.
4 3
Private actors may, and do, generate projects under the CDM. They may use
CDM projects to offset government-imposed emission reduction requirements,
or they can profit financially by selling or trading credits to other actors (private
or governmental) who must meet emissions reduction targets or who voluntarily
offset their emissions. 44 Private actors generated US$30 billion per year worth of
CDM projects in the two years after entry into force of the KP.45
The KP requires that part of CDM funds be used "to assist developing country
Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change to
meet the costs of adaptation. 4 6 The COP set this as a 2% fee of all certified
emissions reductions (CERs) generated by CDM projects. 47 The CDM's Adapta-
tion Fund is expected to bring in US$80-300 million per year between 2008 and
2012.48 This money is much needed. But twelve years after the KP was
established, and four years after it has gone into effect, parties have made scant
progress on guidelines for appropriate use of the Adaptation Fund.49 The
standards I propose here point towards existing IHRL and EEL parties should
heed when formulating guidelines.
Nor have adaptation efforts taken off outside the auspices of the formal climate
change treaty regime. Although at COP-15 Northern nations' made new promises
of adaptation aid, thus far Northern nations have spent only about US$40 million
per year in voluntary aid to help Southern nations adapt, while spending about
US$40 billion per year helping themselves adapt. 50 Kevin Watkins, of the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol:
Emissions Trading, the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation, http://unfccc.int/
kyoto-protocol/mechanisms/items/1673.php (last visited Feb. 2, 2010).
41. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 37, art. 17; Anita M. Halvorssen, Common, But Differentiated Commitments
in the Future Climate Change Regime - Amending the Kyoto Protocol to Include Annex C and the Annex C
Mitigation Fund, 18 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 247, 257 (2007).
42. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 37, art. 6.
43. Ian H. Rowlands, Atmosphere and Outerspace, in THE OxFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 315,
331 (Bodansky et al. 2007).
44. Carr & Rosembuj, supra note 38, at 48.
45. Carr & Rosembuj, supra note 38, at 50.
46. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 37, art. 12.8.
47. UNFCCC, Adaptation Fund, http://unfccc.intlcooperationand-supportlfinancial-mechanism/items/
3659.php (last visited Feb. 2, 2010); FARHANA YAMIN, CLIaE CHANGE AND CARBON MARKETS 30 (2005).
48. UNFCCC, Report of the Adaption Fund Board, U.N. FCCCIKP/CMP/2009/14 (Nov. 14 2009) at 41,
available at http:llunfccc.intlresource/docs/2009/cmp5/engl4.pdf.
49. The Bali Action Plan calls for enhanced action on adaptation, including all the basic steps one would
have expected to have occurred long ago. UNFCCC COP 13, Bali Action Plan (2008), available at
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop-13/application/pdf/cpbaliaction.pdf.
50. Andrew Revkin, Poor Nations to Bear Brunt as World Warms, N.Y. TIMES, March 31, 2007. At the recent
COP, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton proposed that Northern nations would invest $US100 billion
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Nations Human Development Report Office, notes that this "borders on the
derisory,' 5 and Archbishop Desmond Tutu calls this "climate change apart-
heid."
52
No overarching MEA governs international forest protection in a fashion
analogous to the UNFCCC legal guidance on global climate change. The U.N.
General Assembly has adopted a "Non-legally Binding Instrument on All Types
of Forest," a statement of soft law seeking to guide international action to prevent
deforestation and to provide forest-based benefits for local people and financial
assistance for forest preservation.53 The ILO Convention 169, Convention on
Biological Diversity (CBD), Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, and the U.N.
Convention to Combat Desertification all have added treaty law to forest
management.54 The International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA) focuses on
long-term forest sustainability while encouraging timber trade.5 5 Various other
U.N. declarations (including the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and
the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation from the 2002 World Summit on
Sustainable Development), World Bank policy, and voluntary standards (such as
the Forest Stewardship Council's standards56) act as a patchwork of principles for
the management of international forests. Continuously staggering rates of defor-
estation render the results of this legal patchwork unimpressive.57
C. FOREST CARBON PROJECTS
Forest carbon project developers reforest degraded ecosystems, or preserve
extant forests that otherwise would be destroyed or degraded. The developer can
then sell the carbon, now sequestered in the trees and underground biomass, for a
annually in an adaptation fund, although no binding promise has emerged from this proposal. Lisa Friedman &
Darren Samuleson, Hillary Clinton Pledges $10OBfor Developing Countries, NEw YORK TmIEs, 17 Dec. 2009.
51. Revkin, supra note 50.
52. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008, supra note 32, at 166.
53. Non-Legally Binding Instrument on All Types of Forests 21, UNFF 2007 A/C.2/62/1.5 (Oct. 22, 2007)
[hereinafter Non-Legally Binding].
54. Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79, available at
http://www.cbd.int/convention/convention.shtmi; Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, Ramsar, Feb 2, 1971, 996
U.N.T.S. 245, available at http://www.ramsar.org/key-conve.htl; International Labour Organization Conven-
tion 169: Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27, 1989, 28
I.L.M. 1382 (entered into force Sept. 5, 1991); UN Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries
Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa (UNCCD), June 17, 1994, 1954
U.N.T.S. 3.
55. REDUCING EussIONS, supra note 4, at 6.
56. FSC, About the Forest Stewardship Council, http://www.fsc.org/about-fsc.html (last visited Feb. 1,
2010).
57. HuMpiRys, supra note 8, at 114-15; REDUCING EMISSIONS, supra note 4, at 5; Steven Bernstein &
Benjain Cashore, Non-State Global Governance: Is Forest Certification a Legitimate'Alternative to a Global
Forest Convention? in HARD CHOICES, SoFr LAW: VOLUNTARY STANDARDS IN GLOBAL TRADE, ENVIRONMENT
AND SOCIAL GOvERNANCE 42 (John J. Kirton & Michael J. Trebilcock, eds., 2004).
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contracted period of time.58 Buyers include nations who must meet required
emissions reductions under the KP and private entities whose governments
impose emissions reductions on them but whose profits depend on GHG
emissions and thus wish to continue to pollute in exchange for cheaper carbon
storage elsewhere. Businesses and organizations that desire a green image also
invest in forest carbon, 59 as do consumers who voluntarily offset their carbon
footprint by investing in stored carbon, and carbon brokers who sell carbon
credits for profit to any of the above entities.6 ° Projects that prevent deforestation
are currently excluded from CDM eligibility.61 However, reforestation projects
are permitted.62 Only thirteen such projects have thus far been registered, but
others await approval.63 However, the successor agreement to the KP (if there is
one) is likely to include expanded REDD eligibility.64 Pending U.S. climate
legislation encourages offsets for reforestation or avoided deforestation.65
Outside the UNFCCC and KP, voluntary markets in carbon offsets are
thriving.66 Forests are the most prevalent source of carbon offsetting in the
voluntary market, in part because, as one study notes, "[p]eople like trees."67 In
2008, Merrill Lynch became the first Wall Street firm to invest seriously in forest
carbon, spending US$9 million to preserve 768,000 hectares of forest in Sumatra.68
In 2008, the voluntary market for carbon offsets brought in US$705 million,
more than double the year before. 69 That figure could grow to US$40 billion by
2010, and experts forecast that the carbon industry will eventually grow to
US$200 billion per year or more within a decade.70 As of 2006, more than 30
58. Details of various property arrangements for forest carbon are available in TAKACS, supra note 2.
59. Katherine Hamilton, et al., Carving a Niche for Forests in the Voluntary Carbon Markets, in CLIMATE
CHANGE AND FORESTS: EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 3, at 293.
60. Kanter, supra note 9; CLEAN AIR - COOL PLANET, A CONSUMER'S GUIDE TO RETAIL OFFSET PROVIDERS iii
(2006), available at http://www~cleanair-coolplanet.org/ConsumersGuidetoCarbonOffsets.pdf; KATHERIn HALM-
ILTON ET AL., FORTIFYING THE FOUNDATION: STATE OF THE VOLUNTARY CARBON MARKETS 2009 ix, available at
http://ecosystemmarketplace.com/documents/cms-documents/StateOfrheVoluntaryCarbonMarkets-2009.pdf.
61. ANGELA CROOKS, FINANCING CLIMATE ADAPTATION AND MITIGATION IN RURAL AREAS OF DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 7 (USAID 2009).
62. Id.
63. CDM, Distribution of Registered Project Activities by Scope, http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Registration/
RegisteredProjByScopePieChart.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2010); See TAKACS, supra note 2, at 23 (for
discussion of the first CDM forest project).
64. See, e.g., UNFCCC supra note 35; Gelling, supra note 10; Freestone, supra note 4, at ix; Streck et al.,
supra note 3, at 7.
65. H.R. 2454, supra note 12.
66. ROE ET AL., supra note 8, at 2.
67. Hamilton et al., supra note 60, at 292; Marisa Meizlish & David Brand, Developing Forestry Carbon
Projects for the Voluntary Carbon Market: A Practical Analysis, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS: EMERGING
POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNIrIEs, supra note 3, at 311.
. 68. Marc Gunther, Merrill Lynch's Carbon Bet, CNNMoney.com, Apr. 18, 2008, available at http://
money.cnn.com/2008/04/17/technology/carbonfarming.fortune/?postversion = 2008041808.
69. HAMILTON ET AL., supra note 59, at ii.
70. Kanter, supra note 9.
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companies sold carbon offsets.7' Hundreds more are in the carbon offset business
as brokers, retailers, developers, wholesalers, or consultants.
72
The 2006 Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change cites avoided
deforestation as the cheapest way to offset GHG emissions. 73 To serve the market
of those who wish to offset their emissions cheaply and/or reap profit in the
process, as Pagiola et al. note, "costs and risks must be minimized" and forest
project owners may compete with each other by lowering prices to attract
investors.74 The forests of the South offer an alluring financial and ecological
sink for Northern investors because they allow Northern entities to continue
hydrocarbon-intensive business-as-usual while paying poor governments and
people to reforest or keep their forests intact.
75
Forest carbon investments advance deep equity to the extent that they help
bring forth rapid, real reductions in GHG emissions that slow the advent of
climate change, i.e., they mitigate GHG emissions.7 6 This paper, however, is not
about GHG mitigation per se.7 7 Offsets are GHG reductions or removals that
counterbalance a continued emission of equal magnitude elsewhere. Forest
carbon investments may not only fail to mitigate GHG build-up-they may
increase GHG emissions.78 Here, however, I analyze forest carbon projects as
71. CLEAN AIR - COOL PLANET, supra note 60, at i.
72. Id. at iii; Mark Meyrick, What is a Fair Price for CDM Credits? in EQUAL EXCHANGE: DETERMINING A
FAIR PRICE FOR CARBON, supra note 6, at 101-02.
73. Streck et al., supra note 3, at 4.
74. Pagiola et al., supra note 4, at 267.
75. ROE Er AL., supra note 8, at 2; Stefano Pagiola, et al., Making Market-based Mechanisms Work for
Forests and People, in SELLING FOREST ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES: MARKET-BASED MECHANISMS FOR FOREST
CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 4, at 267.
76. See UNFCCC, supra note 35, at art. 2.
77. For an analysis of global climate change, mitigation, and human rights, see Sara C. Aminzadeh, A Moral
Imperative: The Human Rights Implications of Climate Change. 30 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 231 (2007);
Hari M. Osofsky, Learning from Environmental Justice: A New Model for International Environmental Rights,
24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 71 (2005).
78. Skeptics claim that these projects have problems with leakage (communities that formerly relied upon a
forest are likely to cut trees elsewhere; a government may preserve one forest from logging and instead offer
timber concessions elsewhere; logging companies denied concession rights in one country may instead cut
timber in a neighboring country), Imke Sagemuiller, Forest Sinks Under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol: Opportunity or Risk for Biodiversity, 31 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 189, 195-96 (2006); Nelson, supra note 7, at 645; Johannes Ebeling, Risks and Criticisms of
Forestry-Based Climate Change Mitigation and Carbon Trading, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS: EMERGING
POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 3 at 50-51; Forest Carbon Partnership Facility [FCPF],
Concept Note 4, www.forestcarbonpartnership.org (last visited Feb. 1, 2010); Gary C. Bryner, Carbon Markets:
Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions Through Emissions Trading 17 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 267, 291 (2004);
permanence (forests bum or get chopped down), CuLLET, supra note 40, at 124; Ebeling, supra, at 47;
quantifiability (projects pose technical challenges of calculating present and future carbon stored in forests,
particularly under different climate change scenarios) Brian Walsh, Getting Credit for Saving Trees, TIME, July
23, 2007; Baumert, supra note 38, at 404; and additionality (project developers must show the project would not
have been undertaken but for the project. When such additionality is false - as it has been shown to be in as
many as 20% of CDM projects - they result in a net increase in GHG emissions). Meizlish & Brand, supra
note 67, at 317; Lom, IANN, supra note 8, at 145; Sebastian M. Scholz & Martina Jung, Forestry Projects under
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climate change adaptation and the direct effects they have on the communities in
which they operate. A project that redistributes wealth (accrued through GHG
pollution) from richer to poorer communities may help the latter adapt and create
a more equitable world where rights are advanced for more of the planet's current
and future citizens.
While so much is at stake in forest carbon investments-global profits, local
livelihoods, and human and ecological community survival-little formal domes-
tic or international law regulates the actors who have much to lose and to gain.
While validation as a CDM project requires complicated technical calculations
about carbon storage,79 the standards for what counts as sustainable development
or for what project participants must do to ensure socioeconomic benefits of local
communities are poorly developed. 80 The approved methodologies for reforesta-
tion for CDM projects do not include social or human rights criteria.81 CDM
projects must take into account comments of local participants, but need not heed
them nor cancel a project if local opposition is strong.
Voluntary market offsets are not subject to mandatory international regula-
tions. Into this breach launches a number of private initiatives designed, and
sometimes competing, to regulate these projects. The social and environmental
standard generated by the Climate, Community & Biodiversity Alliance (CCB)
are among the most rigorous, and self-billed as "the most widely used and
respected international standard(s)," with eighteen projects being validated and
dozens more in the pipeline.82 CCB comprises a coalition of NGOs (e.g. TNC,
Wildlife Conservation Society, CARE), research institutions, and corporations.83
The latter includes BP, Intel, SC Johnson, and Weyerhaeuser, and carbon-related
businesses that stand to profit from forest carbon projects, such as Sustainable
Forestry Management 84 and GFA Consulting Group.85 Groups like TNC or
CARE wish to implement some form of regulation that supports their goals-
e.g., preserving biodiversity or alleviating poverty. Carbon businesses may
the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation: Rules and Regulations, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND
FORESTS: EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 3, at 76-77. Thus, forest carbon schemes
may not mitigate climate change, and may increase GHG emissions.
79. Scholz &Jung, supra note 78, at 76-77.
80. Baumert, supra note 38, at 399.
81. See UNFCCC, Approved A/R Methodologies, http://cdm.unfccc.int/methodologies/ARmethodologies/
approvedar.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2010) (no mention of social or human rights tools).
82. CCB, CLIMATE, CoMMuNrrY, & BIODrVERsrrY PRoJECT DESIGN STANDARDS 4, (2d ed., 2008), available at
http://www.climate-standards.orglstandards/thestandards.htmil, at 4; CCB, CCB Projects, http://www.climate-
standards.org/projects/index.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2010).
83. CCB, Members, http:www.climate-standards.org/who/partgroups.html (last visited Feb. 3,2010).
84. Whose "principal revenues will be derived from supplying and trading carbon dioxide emission credits
and offsets in the carbon market and from the harvest of environmentally certified timber," Ecosystem
Marketplace, Sustainable Forestry Management Limited, http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/dynamic/
organization.page.php?page id = 982&section = directory&od = 1 (last visited Feb. 3, 2010).
85. Whose business dealings include forest certification and carbon brokerage and advising. GFA Consulting
Group, http://www.gfa-group.de/indices/home-index-sgf_953162.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2010).
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accept such voluntary regulation in order to advertise their corporate social
responsibility to consumers, and/or to show that industry can regulate itself, thus
obviating the need for more formal legal strictures.86
The CCB seeks to "deliver credible and significant climate, community, and
biodiversity benefits in an integrated and sustainable manner" and thereby
"minimize risks by identifying high-quality projects that are unlikely to become
implicated in controversy., 87 Like other environmental certification schemes
(e.g., the Forest Stewardship Council's sustainable timber certification), project
proponents hope that by using these standards they can promote stability and
connote quality, and thus command premium prices from sophisticated consum-
ers. 88 For example, the CCB standards guided Merrill Lynch's Sumatra deal, in
which the company invests in "exceptional, high-quality (and resilient) projects
most likely to avoid implementation roadblocks and deliver their stated outcome,
including generating credible and robust carbon offsets."8 9
Investments in forest carbon are not going away. Norway, for example, has
announced plans to spend over US$600 million per year on carbon offsets in
forestry projects in the nation's attempt to be carbon neutral by 2030.90 The
recent COP UNFCCC conference in Copenhagen's only success may be the
progress made in promoting Northern aid for southern REDD projects.9 In the
United States, particularly in California, climate change statutes present a
potential bonanza for forest carbon investments.92 The strong alliance of busi-
ness, research, humanitarian organizations, and environmental groups collaborat-
ing on forest carbon schemes show how normally antagonistic players are
investing their hopes and dreams in swatches of forest still hanging on in the
developing world, or still to be (re)created in that same world.
Forest carbon investments have enormous potential to wield powerful influ-
ence on how human and ecological communities are configured in distant lands.
The following analysis envisions a set of guidelines that would provide maxi-
mum prosperity for forest-dependent communities while setting the highest
possible legal standards.
86. Jason Morrison & Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Private and Quasi-Private Standard Setting, in THE OxFoRD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 43, at 504; PETER T. MucimINsKI, MULTINA-
TIONAL ENTERPmisEs AND THE LAW 567 (2007).
87. CCB, supra note 82, at 6-7.
88. Id.; Morrison & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 86, at 504; see Forest Stewardship Council, http:I/
www.fsc.org/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2010).
89. Local Communities: Raising the Bar for Carbon Forestry Projects, BusINESS, 2010 NEWSLETTER:
CLIMATE CHANGE (Convention on Biological Diversity, Montreal) May 2007, available at http://www.cbd.int/
doc/newsletters/news-biz-2007-05/?articleid= 109.
90. Norway Plans Record 2010 Carbon Capture Spending, REurRs, Oct. 13, 2009.
91. See Copenhagen Accord, supra note 11; Friedman and Samuelson, supra note 50.
92. H.R. 2454, supra note 12; CARB, supra note 13.
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m11. FOREST CARBON PROJECTS AND PRINCIPLES OF DEEP EQUITY
In the following sections, I describe various legal principles that I believe
should guide forest carbon investments. I point out the various principles of
lHRL encoded in treaties and covenants, and I discuss emerging principles of
customary International Environmental Law (IEL). In some cases, as in IHRL,
the precepts bind home and host nations when engaging in or regulating forest
carbon projects. But in other cases, as in customary principals or in treaty law
involving non-governmental actors, it is less certain that a given principal will
apply to a particular actor in a specific forest carbon context.
I do not argue that every highlighted principle dictates legal obligations to
every actor in every situation. I am more concerned with laying out a framework
for how forest carbon investments, with so much potential for advancing deep
equity, might live up to that promise in an ideal world. Carbon is a new
commodity and forest carbon projects" are a new way of capitalizing on that
commodity; we are still in a period of trial and error. This section is a toolkit for
constructing forest carbon deals that adopt the most generous reading possible of
international law, and in so doing, help fulfill forest carbon's potential for
advancing simultaneously individual, community, and ecological health and
potential.
A. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
1. Introduction to Customary International Environmental Law (IEL)
In this section I lay out principles that are emerging in customary EEL, included
in international and regional conventions, national constitutions and legislation,
and international and domestic legal opinions.93 Unlike formal treaty obligations,
such as those that bind signatories to the major human rights instruments, these
principles float in soft law legal limbo, wielding moral persuasion, but not
conclusively conferring legal obligations. Several of these principles codify
principles of deep equity where IEL coincides with IHRL and commitment to the
environment dovetails with commitment to social justice.
Monographs could be written debating the customary status of the norms I
discuss in this section, attempting to clear away the "utter confusion" in the legal
status and implications of these norms. 94 These debates are not within my
bailiwick. No matter what their precise legal status, these principles can and do
93. For a good review, see Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Customary Law and General Principles 449-53, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 43, at 449, 453. Dupuy states that
"customary international environmental law is both omnipresent and of paramount importance."
94. Ild. at 452-53; Ulrich Beyerlin, Policies, Principles, and Rules, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVTRONMENrAL LAW, supra note 43, at 433.; Daniel Bodansky, Customary (and Not So
Customary) International Environmental Law, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 105 (1995).
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have normative effect. I simply urge that state, organizational, and individual
actors in forest carbon projects who seek the maximum, synergistic, deep equity
results interpret these norms in an ethically and legally expansive way. I am not
arguing that such actors are currently required to follow my interpretations, but
that it is ethically preferable that they do. Furthermore, I assert that maximum
sustainability for individuals, communities, ecosystems and international inves-
tors will result if all actors adopt a generous reading of these norms.
2. Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR)
The Principle: CBDR is cited as an emerging principle of customary IEL,95
and is the ethical and legal anchor of the UNFCCC and the KP, as proclaimed in
the UNFCCC's Art. 3:
The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and
future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with
their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.
Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating
climate change and the adverse effects thereof.
9 6
CBDR requires that all nations mitigate climate change and contribute to
adaptation efforts, but requires Northern nations to make greater contributions. 97
The climate change conventions' legal obligations stem from pragmatic reality
rooted in ethical obligation. Pragmatically, only some nations have financial
resources to mitigate and help others adapt; ethically, those resources come from
economic development, the excesses of which foul(ed) the global atmospheric
commons. Developed nations, thus, bear the primary responsibility to clean up
and help others adapt to the pollution they have caused as they have achieved
economic prosperity."
How forest carbon projects could contribute or detract here: Projects that
genuinely mitigate Northern emissions while helping the South adapt to global
climate change adhere to CBDR. However, projects that allow Northern nations
to evade reducing their own emissions and further undercut the South's ability to
adapt violate CBDR's equity prescriptions. It is important to note that Southern
95. Cuur, supra note 40, at 88-89 (contending that CBDR is not now, but may soon be, a customary
principle); SuMuDu A. ATAPATrU, EMERGING PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 435 (2006)
(contending that CBDR is not yet a customary principle, and has no application outside of express language in
various MEAs); Beyerlin, supra note 94, at 442.
96. UNFCCC, supra note 35, art. 3(1); Lavanya Rajamani, The Nature, Promise, and Limits of Differential
Treatment in the Climate Regime 16 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 81, 93 (2005); Kyoto Protocol, supra note 37, art 10,
art. 10(c).
97. CuLar, supra note 40, at 87.
98. Philippe Cullet & Annie Patricia Kameri-Mbote, Activities Implemented Jointly in the Forestry Sector:
Conceptual and Operational Fallacies, 10 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 98, 102-03 (1997); Halvorssen, supra note
41 at 254; Rajamani, supra note 96, at 89.
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nations also have CBDR obligations under the climate treaties. While they have
no binding emissions reduction targets, they must still work to mitigate climate
change. They must establish Designated National Authorities (DNAs) who will
assist CDM project developers and will approve (or not) all proposed CDM
projects, according to the nation's sustainable development criteria. 99 In section
V.C: Host States as Duty Bearers, I discuss why DNAs may be unable or
unwilling to fulfill their legal duties.
What an ideal forest carbon project would look for/include/seek to do: The KP
permits private actors to participate in the CDM, but it remains murky whether
they are "Parties" who are required to operate within the CBDR framework that
guides state actors.1°° Nonetheless, CBDR is available to guide project develop-
ers, and some carbon brokers have adopted it as a fundamental principle.101 But
by allowing private actors to conduct forest projects (and other CDM projects) as
profit-making offsets, the KP implicitly sanctions a reverse CBDR: the rich in the
North may disproportionately benefit through continuing to engage in activities
that generate profit while emitting GHGs, such as selling and trading carbon
credits, selling lumber after the project terminates, and pursuing ancillary
business opportunities they gain through establishing a presence in a communi-
ty.t°2 While the CCB 2008 standards require "net positive impacts on the social
and economic well-being of communities,"10 3 that does not prevent distant
wealthy communities from profiting even more than local communities.
To respect CBDR means finding ways to preclude the rich from getting richer
at the expense of the poor through forest carbon investments. 1°4 Offsets under the
formal treaty regime should be above all real, quantifiable, and verifiable, with
stricter restrictions on Northern industries that are primarily responsible for these
emissions, as well as real, quantifiable, and verifiable restrictions on citizen
consumers who demand the products that lead industries to. pollute. Only after
wealthy nations have achieved their GHG reduction targets would investors be
able to invest in offsets. Southern communities (as opposed to Northern project
developers) should hold the disproportionate share of carbon credits and should
disproportionately benefit economically. This also means they should not bear a
disproportionate share of the burden if the project fails to produce the contracted
99. KAREN CAPOOR & PHILIPPE AMBROSI, STATE AND TRENDS OF THE CARBON MARKET 2006: A Focus ON
AFRICA 23, 24 (world Bank 2006); Ebeling, supra note 78, at 54.
100. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 38, arts. 1.6, 12.9 (Article 1.6 states that "'Party' means, unless the context
otherwise indicates, a Party to this Protocol.")
101. See, e.g., THE CARBON NEUTRAL COMPANY, THE CARBONNEUTRAL PROTOCOL: A FRAMEWORK FOR
EFFECrIVE ACTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 19 (2006), available at http://www.carbonneutral.com/pages/
cnprotocol.asp.
102. CAPoOR & AMBROSI, supra note 99, at 25; Takacs, supra note 25, at 70-77, (details the many actors who
are profiting financially from forest carbon projects).
103. CCB, supra note 82, at 25.
104. See also proposals listed in the intra- and inter-generational equity sections, infra.
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credits.'o 5 Quite simply, every project should leave the poorer party disproportion-
ately better off than it leaves the wealthier party; gaps between rich and poor
should narrow, not widen.
Lack of resources influences the ability to negotiate fair projects, both locally
at the project level and globally when negotiating treaties and rulemaking.
0 6
Thus "honest brokers" ' 7 or ombudspersons should always be present (and
funded by project developers) to help ensure that poor communities and individu-
als disproportionately benefit from projects. Aid should be provided in global
negotiations to make sure poor peoples' interests are disproportionately repre-
sented in treaty negotiations and rulemaking.
3. Sustainable Development
CBDR is an ethical and legal principle that provides a rationale to efforts to
promote sustainable development.
The Principle: Sustainable development includes the following four elements:
1) economic, social, and environmental policies are integrated; 2) the needs of
the poor are given priority and the gap between rich and poor is narrowed
(intra-generational equity); 3) the needs of future generations are considered
(inter-generational equity);108 and 4) "nature is the true infrastructure of society"
and thus ecosystem services are preserved for the needs of present and future
generations (usually of humans).109
No single definition of "sustainable development" exists and it is unclear
whether it is yet a customary, legally binding principle.tl° Therefore it is difficult
to derive policy standards against which one could measure an action in its name
or hold an actor legally responsible for not fulfilling responsibilities. 1 ' However,
we can examine particular forest carbon schemes to see if they narrow the gap
between rich and poor in the present generation, to predict if they are likely to
narrow that gap in future generations, and to see whether they are likely to sustain
functioning ecosystems necessary for human prosperity.
105. KATOOMBA GROUP, supra note 6, at 13.
106. Mace, supra note 34, at 5.
107. KATOOMBA GROUP, supra note 6, at 13.
108. I could discuss intra- and inter-generational equity as separate principles of customary IEL but I discuss
it here because most discussions/definitions of "sustainable development" emphasize the intra- and inter-
generational equity components. In fact, "sustainable development" is so protean that much of what I discuss
here could fall under its aegis.
109. Daniel Barstow Magraw & Lisa D. Hawke, Sustainable Development, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 43, at 619-20.
110. ATAPATrU, supra note 95, at 182-94, offers an extensive review of the debate around the precise legal
status of sustainable development, and concludes that while it may not have achieved customary legal status it
nonetheless has "a distinct quality under international law" as an influential norm that guides policy.
111. Nelson, supra note 7, at 622-24; Mindy G. Nigoff, The Clean Development Mechanism: Does the
Current Structure Facilitate Kyoto Protocol Compliance?, 18 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 249, 256 (2006).
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The UNFCCC and KP repeatedly refer to Southern nations' primary interest in
"sustainable development."'' 12 The UNFCCC's Art. 3(4) asserts that "[tihe
Parties have a right to, and should, promote sustainable development," in both
mitigation and adaptation."13 Art. 4(7) of the UNFCCC states, "economic and
social development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities
of the developing country Parties. 1' 4 The KP's Art. 10 requires parties to
"advance the implementation of these commitments in order to achieve sustain-
able development."'1 15 Forest offsets under the CDM should thus further the
social development needs of local populations while preserving the natural
environment on which that development depends.
Climate change exacerbates poverty and widens the gap between rich and
poor.116 The UNDP argues that climate change can hamper achievement of the
MDGs, but smart CDM carbon investments can advance those goals."i 7 The
World Bank argues that greater investment in forestry preservation-under the
Bank's auspices-can address poverty reduction and sustainable environmental
management. 1 8 While Southern nations' first priority in negotiating the KP and
in setting up the CDM was to commit the North to mitigating climate change
through sustainable development, 1 9 the principle could be used against Southern
nations who wish to exploit their forests (seen as objects of "common concern to
humankind") to alleviate poverty if such exploitation is not sustainable.' 2 °
Yet promoters of CDM and voluntary offsets argue that projects to conserve
forest carbon could transfer vast sums of money for ecologically sensitive,
poverty-alleviating development in Southern nations. 121 Such investments may
indeed contribute to sustainable development, but ill-conceived, market-driven
choices may also emerge.1 22 The KP does not bind private investors, and thus
they are not legally required to respect the fundamental goals of sustainable
development. 123 Given that Northern nations and private actors have strong
financial incentives to invest in these schemes in the cheapest, most efficient way
112. UNFCCC, supra note 35, art. 3.5; Kyoto Protocol, supra note 37, art. 2.1, art. 10, art. 12.2; Nelson,
supra note 7, at 622.
113. UNFCCC, supra note 35, art. 3.4; Mace, supra note 34, at 48.
114. UNFCCC, supra note 35, art. 4(7).
115. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 37, art. 10.
116. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008, supra note 32, at 8 and throughout (the 2007 Human
Development Report is primarily dedicated to the links between (un)sustainable development and (un)mitigated
global climate change).
117. Id. at 155.
118. WORLD BANK, SUSTAINNG FOREsTs: A DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 1 (Washington, D.C., 2004).
119. Nelson, supra note 7, at 620, 622; Baumert, supra note 38, at 381.
120. A. Dan Tarlock, Exclusive Sovereignty Versus Sustainable Development of a Shared Resource: The
Dilemma of Latin American Rain Forest Management, 32 TEX. INT'L L.J. 37, 65 (1997).
121. See, e.g., Santilli et al., supra note 33, at 4-5.
122. Cullet & Kameri-Mbote, supra note 98, at 99.
123. Nelson, supra note 7, at 636.
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possible, observers worry that sustainable development gets lost in the shuffle. 1
24
Furthermore, some stakeholders are concerned more about traditional environ-
mental values than they are about alleviating poverty. Economic development
may be pushed aside in favor of maximizing carbon savings or biodiversity
preservation.125
If signatories to the KP are legally bound to advance sustainable development,
forest carbon projects are not legal unless they are stringently designed and
monitored to achieve such goals. While the DNAs of host countries are respon-
sible for monitoring projects' sustainable development criteria, they are often
unable or unlikely to fulfill their monitoring responsibilities. 1
26
For forest carbon developers to advance deep equity, they should carefully
plan projects that address the sustainable development goals of Southern govern-
ments and communities. Of sustainable development's four elements, I spend
particular time in this section discussing the principles of intragenerational and
intergenerational equity.
Economic, social, and environmental policies must be integrated: Rio's
Principle 4 avers, "environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of
the development process and cannot be considered in isolation from it.",
12 7
Deeply equitable projects that promote sustainable development would use
ecosystem protection or restoration to advance the economic needs of poor
communities. Proper projects would foment adaptation by strengthening indi-
vidual and community economic, social, and institutional stability through
healthy forests.1 28 Ecosystem services upon which poor communities depend
would be bolstered and sustainable access to these services would be guaran-
teed. 129 Communities whose material condition is improved through forest
carbon investments would, in turn, be less likely to undercut the forests that
sustain them.
The needs of the poorest humans must be given first priority and the gap
between rich and poor must narrow: this is the principle of intra-generational
equity. First, forest carbon projects should narrow the gap between rich and poor
nations. 130 Interpreted through the legal context of CBDR, forest carbon schemes
should foster sustainable development that narrows, not widens, the gap between
rich people in the North and poor people in the South. Projects should be
preferentially proposed, managed, and owned by the poor in the South, who
124. Eriika Melkas, Equitable as Equal: The Kyoto Protocol Project Based Flexibility Mechanisms in an
Unequal World 9 INT'L COMMUNITY L. REV. 263, 276 (2007).
125. See, e.g., GusTrrHs, supra note 8, at 5.
126. See section V.C: Host States as Duty Bearers, below
127. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development Principle 4, June 14, 1992, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/5/Rev. 1 [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
128. For example, as was touted by the World Bank in the FCPF, supra note 78, at 8.
129. FCPF, supra note 78, at 14.
130. GR TrrHs, supra note 8, at 5; ATAPATrU, supra note 97, at 79.
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would benefit materially from the resulting credits. The CCB's standards require
that communities must be better off as a result of projects it certifies-but that
still allows the Northern project developer to gain even more. 3'
Forest carbon projects should also narrow the gap between Southern nations.
While the CDM was meant to benefit a wide range of Southern nations, China,
India, Mexico and Brazil have attracted more than 80% of CDM projects.
1 32
China alone has generated about 50% of the projects representing 60% of the
volume of CERs between 2002-2006.133 China's advanced infrastructure is well
equipped to undertake the bureaucratic and technical requirements of the CDM,
and private actors are eager to gain footholds in lucrative Chinese markets.
134
Investors have largely bypassed African nations, which lack the institutional
infrastructure to cope with the regulatory complexity of CDM projects and to
supervise projects effectively. 135
To remedy this, I propose more unilateral CDM projects within African, and
other poor nations. The CCB 2008 Gold Standard requires that projects be
initiated in poorer countries or in a relatively poor area of wealthier countries. 1
36
CIFOR suggests a corps of international advisors to help relatively unsophisti-
cated nations or communities adapt social and institutional structures to build the
capacity to reap financial benefits of forest carbon. 1 37 Opening up simplified
REDD or small agroforestry projects for CDM eligibility would decrease
inequity because such projects "are relatively accessible to the poor," requiring
less sophisticated institutional or technological infrastructure. 38 Cullet suggests
a "multilateral clearing house" to distribute CDM projects equitably. 139 If a
project occurs in a nation that disproportionately receives CDM or voluntary
market projects, those proposing the project should explain why they are
operating there and how they are balancing their projects between nations. If it is
'not possible to favor poorer nations or regions, developers should be compelled
to contribute some proportion of their project proceeds earned in richer nations to
those less equipped to adapt to climate change.
Projects should narrow the gap between members of a community. Forest
carbon investments may exclude the very poor, those lacking land title, smallhold-
ers who cannot afford to give up land, women, and other marginalized groups.
14
0
131. CCB, supra note 82, at 25.
132. UNEP Risoe Centre, CDM Projects by Host Region, http://cdmpipeline.org/cdm-projects-region.htm
(last visited Feb. 2, 2010).
133. Id.
134. Carr & Rosembuj, supra note 38, at 53.
135. Ofosu-Ahenkorah, supra note 6, at 129.
136. CCB, supra note 82, at 34.
137. CIFOR, supra note 27, at 3.
138. CIFOR, supra note 27, at 1, 4; Pagiola et al., supra note 74, at 283.
139. CULLEr, supra note 40, at 121.
140. Brent Swallow et al., Localizing Demand and Supply of Environmental Services: Interactions with
Property Rights, Collective Action, and the Welfare of the Poor 26, 32 (International Food Policy Research
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To remedy this, eligibility requirements and participation should include the
poorest of the poor."14 Pro-poor "honest brokers" should help negotiate on behalf
of the most marginalized. 142 Developers should- train poor community members
in professional skills that enhance livelihoods even after the project is com-
pleted. 14 3 Rather than being "neutral," projects should be aggressively pro-poor,
pro-female, and pro-landless.'4 Social Impact Assessments conducted in partner-
ship with affected communities should be required to ensure that investments
reduce inequities within communities. 145 It should be clear within a community
how benefits will be equitably allocated, and these terms should be expressed in
all contracts. 1
46
The CCB's 2008 standards require that projects provide net positive benefits
for "the social and economic well-being of communities and ensure that costs and
benefits are equitably shared among community members and constituent groups
during the project lifetime." 147 Those standards also provide a number of
reference tools for judging the benefits. 148 To reach the Gold Standard, the CCB
2008 criteria requires that at least 50% of households within the poorest quartile
benefit substantially from the project, that barriers to the flow of benefits to poor
households are removed, and that any poor households that might suffer are
adequately compensated. 149 These should be required elements of -all forest
carbon investments.
Forest carbon investments should not widen the gap between communities that
receive fair compensation and those that do not. Conversely, projects should not
exclude some forest-dependent communities from their forests while others still
derive sustenance from those forests. While the CCB 2008 standards require that
developers document and mitigate possible negative impacts to communities
outside the project zone, 150 it is still possible that some communities will benefit
and some will not, just as in traditional development assistance.
While some observers urge prioritizing communities with organized infrastruc-
ture, 15 1 this could exacerbate inequities between communities. Instead, invest-
Institute, CAPRI Working Paper #42, 2005); KATOOMBA GROUP, supra note 6, at 50, 60; Quan, supra note 6, at.
34, 36; CoTuLA & MAYERS, supra note 6, at 5.
141. Bracer et al., supra note 6 (providing a detailed analysis for how to structure pro-poor payments for
environmental services contracts); CCB, supra note 82, at 34.
142. KATOOMBA GROUP, supra note 6, at 13, 15.
143. Tipper, supra note 5, at 232.
144. Van Noordwijk et al., supra note 28, at 48.
145. CIFOR, supra note 27, at 2; ATAPATrU, supra note 95, at 295.
146. KATOOMBA GROUP, supra note 6, at 43; CEcrLtA LurRELL ETr AL., FORESTRY BRIEFING 14, THE
IMPUCATIONS OF CARBON FINANCING FOR PRO-POOR COMMUNITY FoREsTRY 4 (Overseas Development Institute
2007).
147. CCB, supra note 82, at 25, 27.
148. CCB, supra note 82, at 42.
149. CCB, supra note 82, at 32.
150. CCB, supra note 82, at 26.
151. Bracer et al., supra note 6, at 28.
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ments should work to build institutional adaptation in communities that
development projects traditionally bypass. Nations or regions should consider
establishing or working within pre-existing inter-village organizations to coopera-
tively plan forest carbon projects.1l 2
Projects may be captured by national elites, exacerbating intranational ineq-
uity.153 Other protections named here protect against this, but certainly a nation's
DNA should scrutinize investments to see who within and outside of the nation is
disproportionately benefiting.
Unless the money finds its way into the hands of those who depend on forest
resources, forest carbon projects can impoverish citizens. 154 The CCB requires
monitoring for livelihood benefits to ward against this form of intragenerational
inequity.1 55 Simple micro-insurance tools should be employed so that failed
schemes do not leave rural communities poorer than when they started.
1 56
Other forms of development aid may be reduced in favor of forest carbon
projects, leaving nations and local people no better off than they were before. 57
Commentators assert that the CDM precludes diverting other types of develop-
ment aid into CDM projects. 158 Northern leaders should pledge against this.
Deforestation through logging or agricultural expansion may actually alleviate
poverty in the short term. Forest carbon projects should compensate for lost
opportunity costs for other forms of development.' 59 To mitigate lost income
from avoided deforestation, projects may include direct payments to citizens, or
payment in the form of schools, clinics, job training, or other community
priorities. 160 Compensation may alsb take the form of microcredit loans for
business start-ups.16
People with land title are likely to reap the economic benefits of forest carbon
investments, and people without title to their lands may receive no compensation
once they are barred from forest use or displaced from their traditional lands.'
62
To avoid this, projects should offer clear title (including title to traditional land
use) that foments project and community stability and narrows the gap between
152. For different legal models of how dependent communities might be defined, see LAWRENCE C. CHRISTY
ET AL., FOREST LAW AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: ADDRESSING CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES THROUGH
LEGAL REFORM 90-93 (2007).
153. ROE Er AL., supra note 8, at 3; Bracer et al., supra note 6, at 36.
154. GRIFrrHS, supra note 8, at 11-13.
155. CCB, supra note 82, at 27.
156. KATOOMBA GROUP, supra note 6, at 23.
157. Id. at 11; Cullet & Kameri-Mbote, supra note 96, at 106.
158. Nelson, supra note 7, at 632-33.
159. CULLET, supra note 40, at 119; KATOOMBA GROUP, supra note 6, at 14,47.
160. KATOOMBA GROUP, supra note 6, at 47.
161. CARMENZA ROBLEDO Er AL., CLIMATE CHANGE AND GOVERNANCE IN THE F6REST SECTOR 34 (2008).
162. Van Noordwijk et al., supra note 28 at 14; Bracer et al, supra note 6, at 31-2; ANDY WHrrE &
ALEJANDRA MARTIN, WHO OWNS THE WORLD'S FORESTS? FOREST TENURE AND PUBLIC FORESTS IN TRANSITION 6
(2002); COTULA & MAYERS, supra note 6, at 3.
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the rich and the poor. t6 3 Nations should have a clear, transparent process for
adjudicating title disputes and should ensure that it is not merely the legally
sophisticated members who acquire title at the expense of poor, forest-dependent
people.
A deep equity view posits that the natural and cultural world are gifts that must
be stewarded wisely to meet the needs, fulfill the potential, and expand the
options of future generations of humans (and nonhumans): this is the principle of
inter-generational equity.' 64 The measures that contribute to intra-generational
equity will also ensure that future citizens will face a more equitable future. The
UNFCCC recognizes this principle of international forest law.
1 65
Forest carbon offsets, however, allow Northern nations to avoid real, quantifi-
able emissions reductions now. Because nations and industries can use offsets
and trading to elude mandatory GHG emissions reductions, Northern nations
have less incentive to develop technologies that will reduce emissions from
energy production and transport, and thus delay transition to a post-hydrocarbon
economy for the North and enable clean, sustainable development in the
South. 66 By allowing offsets, forest carbon sequestration postpones a transition
to a more equitable future, and requires that future generations will have to
sequester GHGs that are emitted now.
167
Furthermore, offset developers are often looking for the cheapest possible
forest carbon, and thus may pluck the "low hanging fruit" in Southern nations.
These projects will then be unavailable when Southern nations in the future have
binding emissions reductions requirements, thus exacerbating intergenerational
inequity.1 68 Nonetheless, forest carbon projects do hold the promise that land
tenure, particularly foi women or those groups less likely to hold property, can be
enhanced and can include succession rights for future generations. 169 Thus, all
projects should document how future generations' individual, community and
ecosystem potential will be furthered through the projects.
4. Preventative and Polluter Pays Principles
Preventing GHG pollution before it occurs, and paying to clean up such
pollution, which has occurred and will continue to occur, would abet sustainable
development and thus deep equity.
163. TAKAcs, supra note 2, at 25; Bracer et al., supra note 6, at 44; Van Noordwijk et al., supra note 28, at 10,
12; See "right to property" section below.
164. EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAmNESS io Frrua GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY,
AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUrrY 2 (1989); Non-Legally Binding, supra note 53, at 104; ATAPArrU, supra note
95, at 78.
165. UNFCCC, supra note 35, art. 3; Non-legally Binding, supra note 54, at 104.
166. Nelson, supra note 7, at 644; LoHmANN, supra note 8, at 176.
167. HumPHREys, supra note 8, at 206.
168. CuLLET, supra note 40, at 119; Nelson, supra note 7, at 646.
169. Van Noordwijk et al., supra note 28, at 10, 12; Co-uLA & MAYERS, supra note 6, at v.
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The Principles: The preventative principle has developed as a "well-
established principle of customary international environmental law" 170 since the
1937 Trail Smelter decision, which held that "no State has the right to use or
permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to
the territory of another or the properties or persons therein, when the case is of
serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing
evidence."17 1 Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration requires "responsi-
bility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause
damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction."' 72 The UNFCCC's Preamble emphasizes that while States
have "the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own
environmental and developmental policies," they nonetheless must refrain from
causing "damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction.1 73 In the context of climate change, this is an equity
argument for mitigation. It is also an argument that projects fomenting adaptation
across boundaries should not damage the host country's environment, for
example, through substituting fast-growing exotic species for endemic species.
If Northern nations continue to emit vast quantities of GHGs, they violate the
preventative principle. The polluter pays principle, captured in Principle 16 of the
Rio Declaration, however, serves as a backstop to promote payment for adapta-
tion. Principle 16 prescribes that "[n]ational authorities should endeavor to
promote the internalization of environmental costs and use of economic instru-
ments, taking into account the approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear
the costs of pollution."
' 174
How forest carbon projects could contribute or detract here: When considered
alongside CBDR, entities should first strive to prevent pollution. Those who do
pollute the global atmospheric commons should internalize the cost of that
pollution. In some versions of the polluter pays principle, polluters must clean up
and compensate those who will be most grievously affected by their pollution.
The polluter pays principle is most often applied to Northern nations, who can
afford to internalize pollution's costs because of the wealth already accrued
through such pollution. 175 CDM offsets, in which the North continues to emit
GHGs in exchange for sequestration in forests in the South, do not prevent GHG
emissions; they allow the polluter not to pay, and thus forestall a transition to a
170. ATAPATrU, supra note 95, at 4.
171. See Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.) 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905, 1950 (Trail Smelter Arb. Trib. 1938
& 1941).
172. United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, June 5-16, 1972, Stockholm Declaration and
Action Plan, princ. 21, U.N. Doc. AICONF.48/14/Rev.1 (June 16, 1972); See also Non-Legally Binding, supra
note 53.
173. UNFCCC, supra note 33, Preamble.
174. Rio Declaration, supra note 127, Principle 16; Beyerlin, supra note 94, at 441.
175. ATAPATU, supra note 95, at 442.
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post-fossil fuel economy. 176 While voluntary offsets do not require a change from
business as usual, they nonetheless result in less GHG pollution emitted than
would otherwise be the case.
What an ideal forest carbon project would look for/include/seek to do: When
polluters fund adaptation through deeply equitable forest carbon projects, particu-
larly as part of the voluntary market, they fulfill their obligation to pay for their
acts.1 77 Offsets under the CDM (or successor) should be in addition to aggressive
mandatory reductions that prevent GHG emissions and spur innovation in
alternative energy that can be disseminated broadly to further prevent GHG
pollution. Investments in forest carbon, or in any technology transfer, might be in
direct proportion to the percentage of GHGs currently or historically emitted to
compensate for that pollution, so that the polluter actually pays to help others
adapt to the consequences of the pollution. 178 Viewed through a different lens, the
"polluter pays" principles should be paired with a "provider gets" principle: the
polluting nations should pay equitable compensation to those nations providing
the environmental service of sequestering carbon. 
179
5. Environmental Democracy
Rio's Principle 10 promotes access to pertinent information for citizens
affected by environmental decisions, the right to participate in decision-making
processes, and the right to access all judicial and administrative proceedings,
including redress and remedy.180 These rights, which I refer to as Environmental
Democracy, constitute emerging norms where environmental and human rights
law intersect. The U.N. Non-legally Binding Instrument on All Types of Forests
affirms that "local communities, forest owners and other relevant stakeholders
contribute to achieving sustainable forest management and should be involved in
a transparent and participatory way in forest decision-making processes that
affect them, as well as in implementing sustainable forest management, in
accordance with national legislation. 1 8 1 Environmental Impact Assessments
(EIAs) with full public input and participation and a general right to access to just
governance also fall under the aegis of environmental democracy.1 82 The Euro-
176. FERN, supra note 8; LoHtANN, supra note 8, at 103-04.
177. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008, supra note 32, at 41; ATAPATTu, supra note 95, at 438-39,
463; ANTOtNETTE HILDERLING, INTERNATIONAL LAW, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND WATER MANAGEMENT 159
(2004); UNFCCC, supra note 35 at art. 4.4.
178. Cass Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 31 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 56 (2007);
Mark A. Drumbl, Poverty Wealth, and Obligation in International Environmental Law, 76 TuL. L. REV. 843,
909 (2002).
179. Pagiola et al., supra note 4, at 6.
180. Rio Declaration, supra note 127, Principle 10.
181. Non-Legally Binding, supra note 53.
182. Rio Declaration, supra note 127, Principle 17; ATAPAiTU, supra note 95, at 305-06; Beyerlin, supra
note 94, at 439-40.
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pean Court of Human Rights has asserted that the right to access information
about environmental hazards is fundamentally linked to respect for privacy and
family life.18 3 The UNECE Aarhus Convention is at the forefront of attempts to
codify and implement these principles of environmental democracy and includes
a complaint mechanism that NGOs can use to advocate on behalf of communi-
ties. Principles of environmental democracy are also finding their way into other
MEAs and domestic constitutions or statutes. For example, the 2003 African
Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources also guaran-
tees access to justice in environmental affairs. 
184
How forest carbon projects could contribute or detract: Investments that
adhere to environmental democracy principles would result in more just projects
and help to develop democratic institutions at the community and national level,
thus furthering institutional adaptation. The Climate Action Network has an
excellent set of recommendations for public participation in CDM projects. 8 5 A
pending U.S. climate bill requires that all REDD activities be conducted "with
consultations with, and full participation of, local communities, indigenous
peoples, and forest-dependent communities in affected areas as partners and
primary stakeholders, prior to and during the design, planning, implementation,
and monitoring and evaluation of activities."1
86
The CCB's 2008 standards also offer promising developments for environmen-
tal democracy. All CCB projects would have to "engage broadly with all
community groups and other stakeholders using socially and culturally appropri-
ate methods.' 87 Affected stakeholders must be able to express concern and
provide impact on project design, and the project proposers must document how
they incorporate this feedback.1 88 Consultation and communication must con-
tinue throughout the life of the project. 189 Yet even in this progressive voluntary
code, affected citizens could not necessarily scuttle a project, and certainly no
standards require that local citizens actually propose, manage, and/or own the
projects.
Forest carbon schemes, whether part of the CDM or voluntary markets, are
often baroque and impenetrable, using complex terminology, confusing acro-
nyms, and abstruse calculations. Communities likely to be affected by the
projects may not know that such projects are proposed.' 90 To'promote environ-
183. Jonas Ebbesson, Public Participation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW, supra note 43, at 699.
184. Id. at 701.
185. CLIMATE ACTION NETwORK, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION N THE CDM AND JI: CLIMATE ACTION NETWORK
(CAN) RECOMMENDATIONS (2001).
186. H.R. 2454, supra note 12, at §754(d)(6)(B).
187. CCB, supra note 82, at 17.
188. Id. at 16-17.
189. Id. at 17.
190. TAKACS, supra note 25, at 67-68; Eveline Trines, History and Context of LULUCF in CLIMATE CHANGE
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mental democracy, project documents for CDM or voluntary projects should be
widely available in the communities likely to be impacted as well as on the
internet, where NGO advocates might also review them. All public information,
including meetings, should be in suitable local languages. 9 All documents
should be open for anonymous stakeholder comments, which would be publicly
available. EIAs are not currently required, but should be for all forest carbon
projects. 192 Such EIAs should be prepared by non-partisan experts, not only prior
to project implementation, but as an ongoing process designed to monitor
projects as they progress.193 Community members should review EIAs and
comment before any project is implemented and should be able to abrogate unjust
projects.
Host communities should be allowed to appoint honest broker ombudspersons
funded by project developers to ensure that local affected populations understand
the implications of any proposed project and to make sure their concerns are
heeded.194 Those ombudspersons should have resources to assist communities
effectively. Local people could be trained to understand forest carbon property
law and to help translate complicated notions of forest carbon-as-property into
legal terms local communities would understand. Such programs exist in Africa
to help community members understand their legal rights and demand justice
against more powerful forces. For example, in Mali, paralegals help traditional
herders to understand their legal rights to access certain property resources, and
also counsel village chiefs on legal rights and how to adjudicate property
disputes. 195
Finally, to ensure environmental democracy in the entire forest carbon legal
system, the communities and nations most likely to be affected by a project (e.g.
indigenous people, poor rainforest nations) should be funded at all gatherings
where forest carbon laws, rules, or standards are negotiated.
196
AND FORESTS: EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 3, at 39.
191. This is required in the CCB standards, supra note 82, at 16.
192. UNFCCC, supra note 35. art. 4(1)(f) asks parties to "employ appropriate methods, for example, impact
assessments, formulated and determined nationally, with a view to minimizing adverse effects on the economy,
on public health and on the quality of the environment, of projects or measures undertaken by them to mitigate
or adapt to climate change." This language is convoluted and vague, and it does not require EIAs of individual
projects.
193. ATAPArrU, supra note 95, at 135.
194. KATOOMBA GROUP, supra note 6, at 16.
195. Boubacar Ba, Paralegals as Agents of Legal Empowerment: The Bankass Area of Mali, in LEGAL
EwowERmENtr IN PRACTnCE: USING LEGAL TOOLS To SECURE LAND RIGHTS IN AFRICA 46, 55 (Lorenzo Cotula &
Paul Mathieu eds., 2008); Simeon Koroma, Paralegals and Community Oversight Boards in Sierra Leone, in
LEGAL EMPowERMENT IN PRAcTICE: USING LEGAL TOOLS To SECURE LAND RIGHTS IN AFRICA at 77, 80; Rita H.
Aciro-Lakor, Land Rights Information Centres in Uganda, in LEGAL EmpOWERMENT IN PRACTICE: USING LEGAL
TOOLS To SECURE LAND RIGHTS IN AFRICA at 71, 72.
196. Mace, supra note 34, at 5; GRIrrits, supra note 8, at 16.
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B. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
1. Introduction to Human Rights
All nations have human rights duties for several reasons: because they have
voluntarily acceded to IHRL treaties, because they are obliged to follow human
rights that have become customary law, or because they must adhere to absolute
jus cogens norms from which no nation may derogate.1 97 Yet within the text of
the UNFCCC, there is no reference to the corpus of IHRL that states are required
to obey. Nor does IHRL appear to be mentioned in any set of voluntary standards.
While the CCB standards require that projects comply with all "applicable
international treaties and agreements," they make no further mention of intema-
tional human rights per se.
198
Private actors notoriously elude international human rights law duties. 199 They
should not. Unlike other public international law norms, human rights ensure
"inherent dignity ' '2°° and thus are "fundamental for each individual human
being. '201 They are universal and should be applied in a nondiscriminatory
way. 2 The Preambles of both the InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) and International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR) declare that "the individual, having duties to other individuals
and to the community to which he belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for
the promotion and observance of the rights recognized in the present Cov-
enant.... ,203 Any entity with power to wreak damage to human rights should
have a duty to respect, protect, and fulfill those rights. This includes forest carbon
investors. Further blurring this legal gray area, are questions of responsibility for
extraterritorial promotion or violation of human rights.2°
In this section, I describe the rights all actors should respect, protect, and
197. This principle is codified for state parties in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 344.
198. CCB, supra note 82, at 20.
199. MuCHLiNsyd, supra note 86, at 517; JANET DINE, COMPANIES, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HUMAN
RIGHTS, 168-69 (2005).
200. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, pmbl., Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR].
201. SIGRUN SKOGLY, BEYOND NATIONAL BORDERS; STATES' OBLIGATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
208 (2006).
202. Id. at 3.
203. ICCPR, supra note 200; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, pt. 1, art. 1,
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCRI. This is a huge debate in international law. See, e.g., DINE,
supra note 199.
204. The High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner on
Human Rights on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Related Business Enterprises with
Regard to Human Rights para. 8(d), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/91 (Feb. 15, 2005); SKOGLY, supra note 201;
Theodor Meron, Extraterritoriality of Human Rights Treaties, 89 Am. J. INT'L L. 78, 81-82 (1995); Fons
Coomans, Some Remarks on the Extraterritorial Application of the ICESCR, in EXTRATERRITORIALAPPLICATION
OF HumAN RIGHTS TREATIES (183-84) (Fons Coomans & Menno T. Kamminga eds., 2004).
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fulfill. Those who nonetheless do not subscribe to the notion that private actors
do, or should, bear human rights duties, may read the analysis below as a
prescription for forest carbon actors who wish to exhibit ethical behavior in
promoting a deeply equitable world. Furthermore, projects, done equitably have
tremendous potential to advance human rights. Likewise, Human rights, if taken
seriously, have tremendous potential to improve forest carbon investments,
because local support lends project stability, and rights-promoting projects can
potentially fetch higher prices from purchasers who desire equitably-sequestered
carbon.
205
All nations have duties to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights. When
Southern nations promote forest carbon investments that force people off their
land and/or remove their means of subsistence, or when Northern nations make
such investments, they are falling in their duty to respect and are directly
abridging human rights. When nations fail to legally control private actors
investing in rights-impairing projects, they fail in their duty to protect human
rights.2z 6 Nations that do not proactively seek to regulate activities of their
private actors are evading their duty to fulfill human rights. Nations, whether in
the South or the North, who do not attempt to channel carbon investments
towards promoting human rights are also failing in their duties to fulfill human
rights.
I will discuss here only rights guaranteed by the ICCPR and ICESCR. The
three major regional agreements all specify human rights duties for member
states. °7 In their own constitutions or laws, some nations have amplified human
rights obligations and made them justiciable and applicable to private actors.20 8
All forest carbon schemes should specify the specific human rights named in
205. CCB, supra note 82, at 6 (discussing the benefits of local support for a project).
206. See Robert McCorquodale & Penelope Simons, Responsibility Beyond Borders: State Responsibility
for Extraterritorial Violations by Corporations of International Human Rights Law, 70 MOD. L. REv. 598, 598
(2007) ("analysis shows that home states of TNCs have obligations under international law in certain situations
to regulate the extraterritorial activities of corporate nationals or the latter's foreign subsidiaries and can incur
international responsibility where they fail to dto so.").
207. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 1, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 [hereinafter African
Charter]. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Council of Europe, § 1,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222; American Convention on Human Rights, chs. I-I1, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123.
208. See generally RICHARD B. LILLIcH Er AL., INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW, POLICY,
AND PRACTCE 100 (4th ed. 2006) (stating that fifty-six constitutions throughout the world guarantee a right to an
environment of a specified quality and that several federal courts deem the constitutional right to a healthy
environment justiciable); For one example of a right to a healthy environment and clean water, see S. AFR.
CONST. 1996 § 24; Gov't of the Republic of S. Aft & Others v. Grootboom & Others, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC)
at 19, 93 (S. Aft.); Jan Glazewski, The Rule of Law: Opportunities for Environmental Justice in the New
Democratic Legal Order, in ENvmoNmENtrAL JusrTcE IN SouTH AFRICA 171, 174 (David A. McDonald ed.,
2002). For a comprehensive review on justiciability of environmental human rights, see David Takacs, The




the appropriate international and regional human rights instruments and docu-
ment how the project respects, protects, and fulfills the particular provisions of
those human rights instruments. Proposals should name the specific human rights
obligations encoded in the national constitution and legislation where the project
developers are working and document how they are fulfilling them.
2. Civil & Political, and Economic, Social, & Cultural Rights
Effective Remedies (ICCPR 2.3(a))
Citizens whose fundamental rights are violated by forest carbon projects
should have prompt appeal and fair remedies with effective legal counsel at a
national or international level. Currently, the CDM prescribes no formal griev-
ance procedures. While proposed projects have an open comment period, project
documents are difficult to find and developers need not heed negative com-
ments.209 The CCB standards require that each project include a grievance
procedure, but neither names fundamental rights that must be monitored, nor
specifies remedies should rights be violated.21°
Each country's DNA must approve a CDM project, but no formal means of
appeal are specified.211 A formal grievance procedure should be established for
each project so that communities who feel that their rights have been violated
have a formal means of redress. That procedure should be at the community or
national level, perhaps as part of the DNA's office. Voluntary market project
grievances could also use the same institutional apparatus. Should the DNA be at
risk of conflict of interest (as we will see below in section V.C: Host States as
Duty Bearers, DNAs might have other reasons for ignoring project human rights
violations) each nation should appoint ombudspersons to advocate for communi-
ties.
A CDM ombudsperson's office should be established to hear grievances when
national appeals fail. Clear channels of communication and clear responsibilities
of grievance managers should be outlined, including a timetable for required
responses. Project developers should demonstrate that an NGO or other "honest
broker" ' is acting to assist rural people to understand the details of the project,
including responsibilities and liabilities. Finally, grievances should be heard both
before a project begins and during the duration of the project. This could be tied
to an EIA process, which is currently not required in either CDM or voluntary
offsets.
209. See supra under "Environmental Democracy."
210. CCB, supra note 82, at 17.
211. Ebeling, supra note 80, at 54; see Bruno Locatelli, et al., Design Issues in Clean Development
Mechanism Forestry Projects, in CLMATE CHANGE AND FoRESTs: EMERGING PoLicY AND MARKEr OPPORTUNI-
TIES, supra note 3, at 114.
212. KATOOMBA GROUP, supra note 6, at 15-16.
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Right to Life (ICCPR Art. 6.1)
"Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected
by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life. ' ' 213 Equitable investments
that secure land tenure fairly and contribute to livelihoods promote the right to
life. Forest carbon projects that foment genuine ecological adaptation help buffer
communities from environmental catastrophes.214 Projects that do the reverse-
deprive people of the ecological base that supports and provides their subsistence-
impair or deny the right to life.215
In my discussion further down in this section of the right to an adequate
standard of living provided by the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, I discuss how CDM or voluntary market projects risk divesting people of
traditional lands and livelihoods. Currently, neither project developers' home
countries nor host countries have sufficient ability or incentive to respect, protect,
and fulfill the right to life that projects can promote or impair. Project developers
should document in detail how projects promote the right to life for all
community members. They should develop monitoring plans to ensure people's
lives and livelihoods are not negatively impacted. This includes not only the
communities formally participating in the project, but also neighboring commu-
nities whose access to traditional resources might be restricted. DNAs or other
host country authorities should have procedures to ensure that investments in fact
respect, protect, and promote the right to life of all their nations' citizens.
Equal Rights for Men and Women (ICCPR Art. 3; ICESCR Art. 3)
The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW) further elaborates these rights, including the particular rights
of rural women. 16 Forest carbon projects could reward women equally to men
and recognize that women often do more of the farm labor and cooking fuel
213. ICCPR, supra note 200, at Art. 6.1.
214. E.g. Gunther, supra note 68; Tipper, supra note 7, at 224,232: "Restoring this woodland means that my
familiy will not have to walk so far to collect wood for cooking. We will also have a good supply of fenceposts
and beams, which are getting very difficult to find these days. (Farmer in Jusnajdb, near ComitAn)." "If these
cedros grow as well as the ones in the next village then by the time my son is old enough to go to college, they
should be worth enough to pay for his fees and upkeep. (Farmer in Muquenal, near Palanque)." See also
examples from Mexico, New Zealand, Madagascar, and elsewhere in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS:
EMERGING POLICY AND MARKEr OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 3.
215. See Sheila Watt-Cloutier, Chair, Inuit Circumpolar Conference, Petition to the Inter American
Commission on Human Right Seeking Relief from Violations Resulting from Global Warming Caused by Acts
and Omissions of the United States 6 (Dec. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Petition].
216. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), art. 14,
adopted by U.N. Gen. Assembly Dec. 18, 1979, 19 I.L.M. 33, available at http://www.un.org/womenwatchldaw/
cedaw/text/econvention.htm#articlel4. Art 14 .2(g), for example, requires that women "have access to agricul-
tural credit and loans, marketing facilities, appropriate technology and equal treatment in land and agrarian
reform as well as in land resettlement schemes."
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collection than men.217 Providing equal access to the potential livelihood benefits
and, at the very least, not barring women from traditional fanning and hunting
lands or wood products sources could further gender equality.
218
CCB's standards mention women as a "disadvantaged" group that could be
targeted for "Exceptional Community Benefits. 219 While attention to women's
needs and representation can increase transaction costs, it can also reduce
implementation costs and promote sustainability, given that women are often the
primary users of forest land.22°
Women's equal participation and benefit is not required in either CDM or
voluntary projects. Given that women traditionally do not hold equal power in
rural areas of Southern nations (or Northern ones, for that matter), this can pose
problems. To promote gender equality, projects should require that women
receive at least 50% of stakeholder participation in design. and management, 50%
of ownership, 50% of governance, and 50% of financial benefits. For example, in
the proposed Amazonas, Brazil Juma Reserve REDD Project, monthly payments
would be made to female heads of household.22' Enforcement plans should
include monitoring for equal participation. Ombudspersons at community, na-
tional, or CDM international levels could specifically consider women's griev-
ances should they be unequal or disadvantaged project participants.
Right to Work (ICESCR Art. 6) and Right to Just and Favourable Conditions of
Work (ICESCR Art. 7)222
Reforestation may be a boon to local economies, particularly if managers pay
fair wages, obey international safety standards, and help local people acquire
sophisticated job skills.2 23 Reforestation usually employs more people more
profitably than avoided deforestation. 224 Avoided deforestation projects could
217. MANjU DUTrA DAS, IMPROVING THE RELEVANCE AND EFFECTIvENESs OF AGRIcuLTURAL EXTENSION
AcrTvrrlEs FOR WOMEN FARMERS (1995), http://www.fao.org/docrep/v4805e/v4805eOO.htm (last visited Feb. 2,
2010); Eva Rehfuess, Sumi Mehta, & Annette Prfiss-Ustin, Assessing Household Solid Fuel Use: Multiple
Implications for the Millennium Development Goals, 114 Envtl. Health Persps. 373, 373-78 (2006) (discussing
fuel collection by women in the developing world).
218. KATOOMBA GROUP, supra note 6, at 42; Quan, supra note 6, at 42.
219. CCB, supra note 82, at 34.
220. Van Noordwijk et al., supra note 28, at 46.
221. FUNDACAO AMAZONAS SUSTENTAVAL, THE JUMA SUSTAINABLE DEvEoPMENT RESERVE PROCr: REDuc-
ING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION IN THE STATE OF AMAZONAS, BRAZIL, PROjacr DESIGN
DOCUMENT 103 (2008), http://www.climate-standards.org/projects/files/juma/PDD-Juma-Reserve-RED-Proiject-
v5_0.pdf (submitted to the Climate, Community & Biodiversity Alliance).
222. These rights include: "fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of
any kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men;" "Safe
and healthy working conditions;" and "[e]qual opportunity for everyone to be promoted in his employment to an
appropriate higher level." ICESCR, supra note 203, at §§((7(a)(i))) (7(b)) (7(c)).
223. Van Noordwijk et al., supra note 28, at 14-15.
224. Van Noordwijk et al., supra note 28, at 17.
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nonetheless be structured to sustain work opportunities including timber and food
gathering and ecotourism.
For example, in a Chiapas project, farmers developed marketable skills in
silviculture, financial planning, and surveying.225 REDD projects can sustain
forest resources that people depend upon for work, although it can also put people
out of work if timber harvesting or other work is prohibited. 26 However, such
employment is not necessarily optimal employment. For example at a a proposed
CDM project in Tanzania a 'developer promised steady employment to replace
traditional grazing land, however in reality they were hiring local people to plant
only between December and March, and was paid less than US$1 per day.
227
Lohmann documents a high profile Ecuadorian scheme in which outsiders
procured the well-paying jobs, and local people were forced to give free labor to
pay off debt.228 In Uganda and elsewhere, farmers provided free labor because
they unwittingly were responsible for upkeep of the project, having signed
contracts whose implications they did not fully understand.229
CCB's 2005 standards created optional labor standards that require project
developers to: use "local stakeholders will fill all employment positions (includ-
ing management) if job requirements are met;" explain how stakeholders will be
selected for positions and where relevant, must indicate how traditionally
underrepresented stakeholders and women will be given a fair chance to fill
positions for which they can be trained;, 230 "[s]how that the project will inform
workers about their rights;" show that "the project complies with international
rules on worker rights;, 231 must "[c]omprehensively assess situations and occu-
pations that pose a substantial risk to worker safety;" put in place a plan " to
inform workers of risks and to explain how to minimize such risks;" and show
"how the risks will be minimized using best work practice" when worker safety
cannot be guaranteed.232 The fact that these criteria are optional, means that
normal CCB certification has been proceeding without guarantees of local
employment or worker safety. However, the 2008 standards are worded so as to
provide more protection of workers' rights, and give local citizens equal opportu-
nity for jobs and capacity building.233
Employment contracts should comply with all ILO treaty standards. Workers
should be informed of all national and international labor standards and should
225. Tipper, supra note 5, at 232.
226. KATOOMBA GROUP, supra note 6, at 11.
227. LOHMANN, supra note 8, at 242.
228. Id at 232-33.
229. Id. at 240.
230. CCB, CmTE, CoMMuIrry, AND BIODivERsrrY PRoJEcr DEsIGN STANDARDS 25 (1st ed. 2005) available
at www.climate-standards.org/pdf/ccb-standardsoct05.pdf.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 25.
233. CCB, supra note 82, at 18.
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understand and freely assent to their risks and rights. Employers would institute
grievance procedures, with impartial ombudspersons available to advocate and
adjudicate disputes. Payment for labor would compensate for opportunity costs
lost from activities that are now precluded.234 Local people would be hired for all
positions they are capable of filling, and where they lack the skills to fill these
positions, training and apprenticeship programs should be established and main-
tained for the duration of the project.
Adequate Standard of Living including adequate food, clothing, and housing,
and continuous improvement of living conditions (ICESCR Art. 11)
As noted under the sections on Rights to Life, Work, and Property, investments
that foment ecological adaptation, promote or preserve work options, and provide
clear land title can promote improved living conditions and allow people to grow
or buy food. Pro-poor investments alleviate poverty and promote this right.
Pagiola et al. cite multiple examples of payment for environmental services to
show where "market mechanisms are associated with investments in local
institutions, education, and health, additional positive spin-offs may be ex-
pected.,,235 The Katoomba Group points out that "[rlegular payments [for
ecosystem services] could.. . . provid[e] both a reliable source of supplemental
income and additional employment in the community. Even a modest payment,
reliably delivered over many years, may provide a meaningful increase in net
income as well as a mechanism for adopting more sustainable land manage-
ment. 236 In other words, ecological adaptation accompanied by social and
institutional adaptation work together to alleviate poverty. Van Noordwijk et al.
distinguish between "weakly pro-poor" projects that transfer income from
wealthy Northern communities to poor Southern communities and "strongly
pro-poor" projects that improve local equity by focusing on the poorest of the
poor within Southern communities.2 37
But forest carbon investments may be designed to offset emissions in the most
inexpensive way possible and to provide profit or ancillary benefits to the
investors; pro-poor strategies may raise the cost of doing business.238 Worse,
forest carbon schemes that disconnect people from their traditional land can lead
to forced relocations or starvation. ENCOFOR, a set of EU guidelines for project
developers, overtly contemplates that projects can acceptably lead to relocation
and the need to import food from other regions. 239 Griffiths notes that "there is
234. Van Noordwijk et al., supra note 28, at 26, 37, 45.
235. Pagiola et al.,.supra note 74, at 283.
236. KATOOMBA GROUP, supra note 6, at 10.
237. Van Noordwijk et al., supra note 28, at 44.
238. Lutrell et al, supra note 146, at 2.
239. CAR1IENZA RoBLEDo & NIcHOLE STF.SKAL, ENViRONMENT AND CoMMuNrrY BASED FRAMEwORK FOR
DESIGNING AFFORESTATION/REFORESTATION PROJECTS IN THE CDM: METHODOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AND CASE
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little concrete evidence" about how precisely a given project will counter
poverty. 240 While the CCB's standards require ''Net Positive Community Im-
pacts" that must be "positive for all community groups," only optional "Gold
Level" projects are required to be "explicitly pro-poor." 41
Elsewhere I document examples that raise red flags about investments that do
not directly address, or remain unconcerned, with poverty alleviation. 242 For
example, the World Bank is investing heavily in forest carbon, buying carbon
credits and buffering Northern investors from risk. About 7% of the Bank's US$2
billion carbon portfolio lies in the Community Development Carbon Fund
(CDCF).243 According to the Fund's website, the "single overarching factor,
which defines this Fund and differentiates it from other World Bank carbon
funds, is the generation of community benefits for the projects it finances. '2 44
That is to say, this Fund "differentiates" from the other nine World Bank Carbon
Funds because it actually focuses on benefiting local communities where it is
investing. CDCF projects are an "opportunity for small communities in poorer
countries to obtain clean water, improve health conditions, create jobs for
women, as much as it is an investment in clean technologies that help reduce
greenhouse gas emissions and mitigate climate change. 245 Carbon projects in
the Bank's portfolio that do not fall under the CDCF's aegis need not focus on
these factors, and thus billions of dollars of Bank funded forest carbon projects
may do nothing to alleviate poverty and may in fact exacerbate poverty.
246
Plans should show how community members' economic status will improve. If
there are winners and losers, the plan would show how the losers will be
compensated. Pro-poor goals should be incorporated into all projects from the
beginning, rather than grafting them on as a side goal or afterthought. 247 Plans
should explain how financial, or other benefits will be distributed within a
community and emphasize how the poorest of the poor will disproportionately
benefit. Project developers should demonstrate how communities not directly
benefiting from a project but potentially impacted by project restrictions will be
compensated. They should explain how people will continue to have sustainable
access to the forest resources they need, such as food, medicine, and building
STUDIES: MANUAL FOR ADDRESSING SOCIAL AND INSTITUTIONAL IssUES 11 (2007), available at http:I/
www.joanneum.at/encofor/tools/tooldemonstration/download-tools.htm (under Social Impact Assessment Tool).
240. GRIFFrrIHS, supra note 8, at 8.
241. CCB, supra note 82, at 11, 34.
242. TAKACS, supra note 2.
243. The World Bank, Community Development Carbon Fund, http://go.worldbank.org/QNLHGWLPSO
(last visited Feb. 2,2010) (for more information concerning the CDCF).
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. See HuMPHREYS, supra note 8, at 168-89 (stating the World Bank's professed forest principles); see also
The Equator Principles, http://www.equator-principles.com (last visited Feb. 13, 2010) (stating the obligations
the World Bank has committed to fulfilling).
247. See LUTRELL ET AL., supra note 146, at 2.
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material, or how cash from employment or carbon credits will compensate for
lost access. 24 8 Developers should document ancillary project benefits, including
new schools, clinics, and microcredit for entrepreneurs whose livelihoods may be
impacted by the scheme.
All forest carbon projects should include a monitoring plan to assess ongoing
community impacts. The CCB 2008 standards require this, but because "a full
community monitoring plan can be costly" the details need not be worked out at
the design stage. 24 9 For full transparency and maximum security, the plan should
be worked out before a community accepts a project. Developers should include
an insurance policy should drawbacks exceed benefits -and impact livelihoods.25 °
The CCB 2008 standards include "optional" "exceptional community benefits"
that are "pro-poor.",2 5 ' These are excellent additional criteria and should be
mandatory for all offsets, whether voluntary or CDM.
Right to Culture (ICCPR Art. 27, ICESCR Art. 15.1(a)
Many indigenous peoples' or local communities' cultures are fundamentally
tied to the ecological world around them.252 Investments that undercut the
ecological matrix in which people live simultaneously erode their culture.
Conversely, investments that revitalize ecosystems may revitalize cultures.
The CCB standards require identifying "[a]reas that are critical for the
traditional cultural identity of local communities, such as areas of cultural,
ecological, economic or religious significance identified in collaboration with the
local communities. 2 53 These areas must be maintained or enhanced.2 54 Further-
more, commodifying an ecosystem service may be incompatible with a local
culture.25 5 Worse still, this cultural lack of translation may lead the local
community to misunderstand what the project is or proposes to do. Investments
that erode local livelihoods also erode community culture.
Project developers should use a participatory approach that identifies cultural
assets tied to the project area and ensure that cultural values are protected or
promoted through the project.
248. See KATOOMBA GROUP, supra note 6, at 11.
249. CCB, supra note 82, at 27.
250. KATOOMBA GROUP, supra note 6, at 12.
251. CCB, supra note 82, at 34.
252. See, e.g., Petition, supra note 215, at 5 (stating effect of climate change on Inuit culture due to the
culture's close tie to the condition of their physical surroundings).
253. CCB, supra note 82, at 13.
254. CCB, supra note 82, at 12-13, 25.
255. KATOOMBA GROUP, supra note 6, at 14.
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Right to Property (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 17)256
Janet Dine argues that "property" is not merely "rights over things, but rights
over people., 25 7 When private actors privatize previously public resources,
"where the relevant item is food or water, the freedom and liberty inherent in
exercise of property rights becomes the death warrant of those whose access to
the item is thereby restricted., 25 8 Forest carbon projects now occupy thousands,
and soon perhaps millions, of acres of land with potentially competing uses. Such
projects could further the right to property for individuals or communities by
securing land tenure and clear title to property as a precondition of a project.
Clear property title is seen as a sine qua non for investment stability,259 and when
this title devolves to those who have traditionally used the land without formal
title, their rights to property and the benefits contained therein are enhanced.2 6 °
Examples from Indonesia, Madagascar, and Mexico suggest that secure land title
increases land's value, reduces corruption, and increases landowners' in-
comes.26 Various sources show that small-scale projects can generate commu-
nity benefits, allowing profits to be generated sustainably from individually or
communally owned property.
262
However, carbon comprises a number of new, confusing, and potentially
conflicting property forms. Different entities may own above ground carbon
sinks, below-ground carbon sinks, the right to manage for maximum carbon
sequestration potential, the carbon itself, and the credits resulting from carbon
emissions reductions.2 6 3 This legal complexity is seldom clarified in national
legislation and is difficult for local, forest dependent communities to under-
256. Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that: "1) Everyone has the right to
own property alone as well as in association with others; 2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property."
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, Art. 17, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st. plen. mtg., U.N.
Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). This right was not elaborated in either the ICCPR or the ICESCR, but is secured in
the major regional human rights conventions. See Petition, supra note 215, at 5.
257. DINE, supra note 199, at 279.
258. Id.
259. Bracer et al., supra note 6 at 43; Monique Miller et al., Legal Issues and Contractual Solutions for
LULUCF Projects Under the Clean Development Mechanism, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS: EMERGING
POLICY AND MARKEr OppoRTurrms, supra note 3, at 169. One of the FSC's ten Principles of ethical forestry is
that "[t]he ownership of the forest must be clearly defined and documented;" another states that "[t]he legal and
customary rights of indigenous peoples ... shall be recognized and protected." HuMPHREYS, supra note 8, at
120; CoTuLA & MAYERS, supra note 6, at 3.
260. Swallow et al., supra note 140, at 17; Van Noordwijk et al., supra note 28, at 10-11; Bracer et al., supra
note 6, at 44; Rosimeiry Portela et al., The Idea of Market-Based Mechanisms for Forest Conservation and
Climate Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FoREsTS: EMERGING POLICY AND MARKEr OPPORTUNITIES, supra note
3, at 25; CoTutLA & MAYERS, supra note 6, at 3.
261. Tipper, supra note 6, at 224-32; GimmHS, supra note 8, at 12-13.
262. ROE ET AL., supra note 8, at 3-4; Tipper, supra note 5, at 224-5; multiple case studies in Streck et al,
supra note 3.




CCB's 2008 standards protect property rights. The interests of capital investors
dovetail with the interests of local people, because projects with clear land title
avoid legal problems; projects that evict people face resistance and thus instabil-
ity and extra expense.265 CCB projects require that the "project will not encroach
uninvited on private property, community property, or government property and
has obtained the free and prior consent of those whose rights will be affected by
the project."266 CCB projects cannot "require the involuntary relocation of
people or of their activities important for the livelihoods and culture of the
communities," and if relocation does happen it is with "free, prior, informed
consent of those concerned with provisions in the agreement for just and fair
compensation. 267 Of course, the project proponents (usually Northern investors)
are also entitled to "clear, uncontested title to the carbon rights," or the investors
must "provide legal documentation demonstrating that the project is undertaken
on behalf of the carbon owners with their full consent. 268
On the other hand, speculators can cut deals that dispossess people of land for
which they have no formal title.269 Because developers wish to reduce transac-
tion costs, it is easier to compensate "only the most visible and vocal stakehold-
ers, ignoring local communities with informal use rights and less ability to
articulate demands" and less likely to hold formal title in the first place.27°
Villages may simply think they are being given a form of charity when forest
carbon offsets are discussed; they may not understand the complexities of this
uniquely Northern property scheme.27'
Where projects oust people from traditional property, Griffiths argues these
relocations are "undermining participating countries' legal obligations to protect
customary use of biological resources and traditional knowledge under the CBD
and various human rights conventions, including the Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD). ' 272 A guidebook for EU
participants in forest carbon offsets suggests relocation as one mitigating strategy
for offsets that displace people.273 Scholars and activists have discussed the
plight of "environmental refugees" from global climate change due to rising sea
264. See id.
265. LoHmANN, supra note 8, at 265; Miller et al., supra note 257, at 164-65.
266. CCB, supra note 82, at 20.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 21.
269. ROE ET AL., supra note 8, at 3; Swallow et al., supra note 140, at 27; LUTRELL ET AL. supra note 148, at 3.
270. J. Smith et al., Harnessing Carbon Markets for Tropical Forest Conservation: Towards a More
Realistic Assessment, in THE EARTHSCAN READER IN FORESTRY AND DEvELoPMENT 323, 334 (Jeffrey Sayer, ed.,
2005).
271. See Swallow et al., supra note 140, at 16-17; UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PRoGRAMME, LEGAL
IssuEs GUIDEBOOK TO THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM 66, 92 (2004).
272. GiuiFrrHs, supra note 8, at 12.
273. See ROBLEDO & STEJSKAL, supra note 239, at 7, 10.
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levels or drought,2 74 and forest carbon investments may directly cause environ-
mental refugees by dispossessing them of their land.275
All stakeholders should help secure clear property rights for individuals or
communities as an ancillary benefit that lead to greater community stability,
investment in sustainable land use, and security for investors.276 Project develop-
ers should secure the free, prior, and informed consent of those whose property
rights will be impacted.277 Developers should document who holds which
property rights with evidence that impacted community members understand.278
They should document how land was used before the project and show that no
one has been dispossessed of their property. To the extent that dispossession of
property has occurred, mitigation should far exceed the loss. Developers should
consider "time bound sequestration agreements" 279 to make property into usu-
fruct and not permanent rights, thus reverting control of the land to local people if
the project proves unprofitable or unjust.
Developers should adopt a legal pluralism approach and investigate and
recognize traditional land claims outside of formal Westernized legal channels,
and show how property has been explained in culturally appropriate ways.
Indigenous communities' claims to land or carbon credits must be respected and
promoted. 280 Government or pro-poor NGOs should supervise and enforce
contracts and property deeds.28 '
3. Environmental Human Rights
The right to a healthy environment is an emerging norm at the intersection of
IHRL and IEL.282 Projects that revitalize degraded ecosystems or protect intact
ecosystems necessary for healthy human communities will further environmental
human rights. Projects that are potentially hazardous to the natural environment,
for example through the planting of non-native species, or projects that preclude
people from accessing vital ecosystem services and products, may undercut the
274. Aminzadeh, supra note 76, at 256-58; see generally Mark Dowie, Conservation Refugees: When
Protecting Nature Means _Kicking People Out, ORION, (Nov./Dec. 2005), available at http://www.orionmagazin-
e.orglindex.plip/articles/article/161/ (discussing how conservation organizations are pushing indigenous com-
mutnities out of their traditional lands in the name of conservation).
275. LoUmAN, supra note 8, at 239-40; See, e.g., HARALD ERAKER, Co2LONALisM: NORWEGIAN TREE
PLANTATIONS, CARBON CREnrrs AND LAND CoNr cs IN UGANDA 14-15 (2000).
276. Quan supra note 6, at 29; Takacs supra note 2, at 60.
277. CCB, supra note 82, at 20.
278. Id. at 13.
279. ROE Ex AL., supra note 8, at 3.
280. See Miller et al., supra note 259, at 170-71.
281. Bracer et al, supra note 6, at 44.
282. See Takacs, supra note 208, at 725-27; see also EAR'rwus-ncE, ENvIRoNMENTAL RIGmS REPORT:
HuwMA PGHrs AND THE ENlRtONmENT, MATERIALS FOR THE 61sT SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION




right to a healthy environment.
Earthjustice documents the "repeated and increasing recognition of a human
rights-based approach to environmental protection. 28 3 While some experts
debate whether this has become a customary principle of international law,284 the
constitutions of over 100 nations stress protection of environmental resources,
and over 100 specify the right to a healthy environment or oblige the nation and
its citizens to prevent environmental harm.285 At least 16 nations name an explicit
right to information about the health of the environment and/or about activities
that may impair that health.286 Both the American Convention on Human Rights
and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights guarantee the right to a
healthy environment.287
The Right to Water comprises a subset of the Right to a Healthy Environment.
In 2007, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights declared that access to a
sufficient amount of safe water is now a fundamental human right.288 While each
country must determine what amount constitutes "sufficient, '289 the High Com-
missioner emphasized that each state should ensure that water is of good quality,
affordable, conveniently available, prioritized for personal and domestic use, and
distributed with no forms of discrimination.2 90 The Right to Water is explicit in
multiple international treaties, including the Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CRC) and the CEDAW.29 1 It is implicit in a range of other treaties whose
provisions guarantee a right to life, health, food, and an adequate standard of
living.292
Projects that avoid further deforestation can contribute to the right to a healthy
environment and the right to water through the protection of forests that filter
283. EARTHJUSTICE, supra note 282, at 1.
284. ATAPATrU, supra note 95, at 23.
285. EARTHJUSTICE, supra note 282, at 37.
286. Id. at 38.
287. African Charter, supra note 210, at art. 24; Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human
Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 11(1), Nov. 17, 1988, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69.
288. The High Commissioner for Human Rights, Annual Report of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights on the Scope and Content of the Relevant Human Rights Obligations Related to Equitable
Access to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation Under International Human Rights Instruments, para. 66, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/6/3 (Aug. 16, 2007) [hereinafter Water Report].
289. Id. at 47. Figures for minimum acceptable amount range from South Africa's guaranteed 25 litres/person/
day to the WHO's recommendation of 100 litres/person/day. Alix Gowlland-Gualtieri, South Africa's Water Law
and Policy Framework: Implications for the Right to Water 7 (IELRC, Working Paper 2007-03), available at
http://www.ielrc.org/content/w0703.pdf; Guy HOwARD & JAlm BARTRAM, DOMESTIC WATER QUANTITY,
SERVICE LEVEL AND HEALTH 22 (2003).
290. Water Report, supra note 288, para. 47.
291. Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 24(c), Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; CEDAW, supra note
216, Art. 14.
292. Water Report, supra 292, para. 5(b); David Takacs, Water Sector Reforms and Principles of Interna-
tional Environmental Law, in WATER LAW FOR THE TWENTY-FIRsT CENTURY 275-77 (Philippe Cullet et al. eds.,
2010); See also Alix-Gowland Gualtieri, International Human Rights Aspects of Water Law Reforms, in WATER
LAW FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 238-41 supra.
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drinking water and protect aboveground and subterranean water sources. Projects
that reforest degraded ecosystems may similarly contribute to this right by
revitalizing local ecosystem services. However, reforestation projects may allow
non-endemic monocrops, or GMO species. This may interfere with locally
adapted ecosystem services, prevent wildlife migration, leach soil nutrients, and
pirate water from other ecosystem elements.293 The CCB standards, however,
now proscribe GMO species.294 The CDM allows GMO tree and plant species,
which potentially could further undercut the right to a clean and healthy
environment.
295
Forest carbon schemes that preclude traditional, sustainable forms of forest
harvesting and instead preserve forests for Northern profits, or solely for
biodiversity, may directly prevent local people from enjoying the right to a clean
and healthy environment; in fact, exercising exclusionary private property rights
can be "a death warrant of those whose access [to food and water] is thereby
restricted.
' 296
Project proposals should name the environmental human rights guaranteed in
the national constitutions of home and host states and explain how the proposed
project helps to respect, protect, and fulfill those rights. Specifically, projects
should document how the project will respect, protect, and fulfill local people's
right to clean water. They should explain how the project will preserve or
improve vital ecosystem resources for local communities, including native trees,
renewable food sources, and pollinator species diversity. Projects should pro-
scribe use of non-native species and GMO species, and should explain how the
project will preserve and improve biodiversity resources, and how people's
access to ecosystem goods and services will improve, or at least not be precluded,
due to the project.
4. Indigenous Peoples' Rights
Climate change disproportionately affects forest-dependent, indigenous
peoples,297 and thus forest carbon projects should be designed to help these
293. CCB, supra note 82, at 28; See LoHmANN, supra note 8, at 227-30,238-40,267-306 (for an example of
ecological drawbacks of using non-native pine and eucalyptus in a forest carbon project in Ecuador), 238, 240,
267, 306.
294. CCB, supra note 82, at 28.
295. Jason Schwartz, "Whose Woods These Are I Think I Know:" How Kyoto May Change Who Controls
Biodiversity, 24 N.Y.U. ENvrt. L.J. 421, 423 (2006); see AFFORESTATION iN GRAssLAND AREAS OF UCtNDILE,
KIomaERo, TANzAN A & MAPANDA, MuFinm, TANZANIA, PRomEr DESION DOCUMENT 3-5, 15 (2007).
296. DaNE, supra note 199, at 279.
297. Note that "indigenous" peoples are not a monolithic group, and various authors have named typologies
that distinguish between them (and their rights) and other groups such as "traditional peoples, settlers on the
agricultural frontiers, long-standing farmers or pastoralists traditional peoples, settlers on the agricultural
frontiers, long-standing farmers or pastoralists facing management of declining resources, and agro-pastoral
and forest dwellers who have been successful in restoring their resource base." Bracer, et. al., supra note 6, at
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peoples adapt. The right of indigenous and tribal peoples to control their own
resources is a principle both of treaty law and of customary international law. 298
The right of all "peoples" to "self determination," i.e. the right to "freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and
cultural development," is the first right enshrined in both the ICCPR and
ICESCR.299
A U.N. Special Rapporteur noted that "removal from or destruction or
degradation of traditional lands inevitably leads to serious loss of life and health
and damage to the cultural integrity of indigenous peoples."'3 °" Self-determina-
tion demands that indigenous people access and control their resource base; deep
equity requires that indigenous groups have clear title to their lands, or see their
traditional land rights honored.30
Where they are full participants or initiators of carbon projects, where they
receive financial benefits from these schemes, and where they help them secure
title, indigenous peoples' human rights may be advanced.30 2 The CBD, CERD,
ILO Convention No. 169, Agenda 21, and the Non-legally Binding Instrument on
All Types of Forests require signatory nations to protect traditional use of
biological resources and traditional knowledge of those resources.30 3 Establish-
ing clear indigenous land rights can be "daunting. ' 3° White & Martin cite the
favorable example of Bolivia, where, through "strong political will," 1.4 million
hectares of forest with clear ownership rights have been established for indig-
305enous communities.
While business groups like the International Timber Trade Organization
(ITTO) proclaim support for indigenous groups' rights,30 6 governments and
24; see also ROBLEDO ET AL., supra note 161, at 31.
298. ILO Convention 169, supra note 54; United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007); Russell Lawrence Barsh, Indigenous Peoples, in
THE OxFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENvIRoNmENTAL LAW, supra note 43, at 845.
299. ICCPR, supra note 200, at art. 1.1; ICESCR, supra note 203, at art 1.1; HUMPHREYS, supra note 8,
atl06.
300. U.N. Econ & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of
Minorities, Final Report on Human Rights and the Environment, para. 77, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9 (July
6, 1994) (prepared by Fatima Zohra Ksentini).
301. WHm & MARTIN, supra note 162, at 6,21.
302. WHITE & MARTIN, supra note 162, at 18.
303. Cited in GPRFrrHS, supra note 8, at 12; CBD, supra note 54, at art 8(j), 10(c); Non-Legally Binding,
supra note 53, at princ. 6(f), 6(y); Rio Declaration, supra note 127, at 15.5(e); ILO Convention 169, supra note
54, at arts. 7(1), 15(1), 16(1), 7(1), and 17(2).
304. WHrm & MARTIN, supra note 162, at 19; see also Chris Tollefson, Indigenous Rights and Forest
Certification in British Columbia, in HARD CHOICES, SoFr LAW: VOLUNTARY STANDARDS IN GLOBAL TRADE,
ENvTRoNmENT, AND SOCIAL GOVERNANCE 101 (John J. Kirton & Michael J. Trebilcock eds., 2004) (discussing
the challenges of establishing aboriginal rights in British Columbia).
305. WHrrE & MARTIN, supra note 162, at 21.
306. United Nations Conference for the Negotiation of a Successor Agreement to the International Tropical
Timber Agreement, 1994, Jan. 16-27, 2006, International Tropical limber Agreement, U.N. Doc. TD/
TIMBER.3/12 (Feb. 1, 2006).
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business interests have strong incentives to capture traditional indigenous land
and traditional forest related knowledge30 7 that may yield riches in the form of
REDD credits.3 °8 Thus forest carbon projects on indigenous lands may be
inequitable, with examples of forced relocations, "guns and guards" protection of
formerly common access resources, and violations of environmental democ-
racy.
309
Indigenous people do not speak with a monolithic voice. Griffiths points out
that some indigenous groups support forest carbon investments, as they see
financial and land tenure benefits accruing from properly negotiated agree-
ments. 310 But even where offsets improve an indigenous community's land
tenure and livelihood, CERs are still often sold to energy companies or other
industrial polluters to continue polluting indigenous groups elsewhere, and thus
some groups oppose them."i'
Ideally, projects should be proposed by and managed by indigenous communi-
ties, with those communities setting all the terms and reaping all the benefits.
Free Prior Informed Consent should be the cornerstone of all projects involving
indigenous groups. This means that once given timely, full information, groups
must give express consent.312 Project proposers should honor traditional indig-
enous notions of property and allow the group to define how those notions will be
respected.3 t3 If the community wishes, an NGO should act as an honest broker to
help negotiate and translate between the indigenous group and the developer.3 14
Impact assessments should be specialized to assess particular indigenous culture,
lands, and knowledge.315
If indigenous people will assume management responsibilities as a part of the
project, these responsibilities must be clearly delineated in a culturally respectful
and appropriate way. In no case should a community be left poorer than before
the project. No group should be barred or restricted access to traditional lands that
form the basis of their subsistence and culture. Representatives of participating
indigenous groups should be trained and encouraged to participate in future
international discussions on forest carbon. Developers should prioritize projects
in nations that have ratified ILO Convention 169, Which codifies indigenous
peoples' resource use rights.
307. HUMPHREYS, supra note 8, at 74.
308. GRuwms, supra note 8, at 12; KATOOMBA GROUP, supra note 6, at 29.
309. GPu, rms, supra note 8, at 12, 15; LoHMANN, supra note 8, at 237; Quan, supra note 6, at 36.
310. GRFFrrHS, supra note 8, at 10.
311. GFRas, supra note 8, at 11.
312. ATAPATrU, supra note 95, at 75; HuMPHREys, supra note 8, at 201.
313. WHrrE & MARTIN, supra note 162, at 21; GRf-Frris, supra note 8, at 10.
314. KATOOMBA GROUP., supra note 6, at 15-16.




IV. FOREST CARBON AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
For those seeking a world of deep equity, forest carbon projects reveal
international law's shortcomings. IHRL disappears in both the formal global
climate change treaty regime and the voluntary market. Principles of IEL where
environment meets social justice are bandied about, but may not be respected in
actual deals. They are not often enforced or enforceable in national courts or
international legal fora and normally do not apply to non-state actors. Some
voluntary standards, such as the CCB's, afford better protections than formal
treaties and associated rulemaking; but if project developers fail to heed those
standards, what court will pursue them? EEL lacks complaint procedures and
enforcement mechanisms. While IHRL does have an enforcement apparatus,
human rights actors have yet to formally pursue inequitable forest carbon
projects.316 Forest carbon schemes pose significant problems for international
law, but also serve as a laboratory for gravely needed reforms. International law,
reformed to regulate these investments, would better promote deep equity for all
situations where human, community, and ecological health and potential are
imperiled.
A. PRIVATE ACTORS AS DUTY BEARERS
Private actors and organizations elude formal international legal duties, which
are largely limited to states. As private entrepreneurs invest in distant forests,
both home and host states may fail to scrutinize their actions. Those investing in
forests as carbon repositories for Northern indusfrial excess-and sometimes
profiting handsomely thereby-may elude responsibility for illegal or immoral
side effects of their investments. It is not merely that some projects fall short of
genuine adaptation. Human lives, human communities, and even ecological
integrity may fall by the wayside without a more functional, aggressive system of
international law.
As a general rule, in IHRL and IEL, nations bear duties. Ratner describes the
"doctrinal straitjacket" that emphasizes state responsibility and duties in IEL and
criticizes the anachronistic emphasis on state responsibility when powerful,
multifaceted non-state actors act across national borders.3 17 "Nations" seldom
pollute; private actors do. Muchlinski notes, "[a]t present there are no detailed
international rules, or procedures, for the environmental regulation of MNEs."
31 8
While private actors may be liable in domestic courts for environmental infrac-
tions, corporate social actors are unlikely to be found liable for violations of
principles of customary IEL, and legal arguments and institutions that would hold
316. ATAPATrU, supra note 95, at 8.
317. Steven R. Ratner, Business, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENvIRONMENTAL LAW, supra
note 43, at 807, 808, 811, 816, 827.
318. M Uc-uNSKI, supra note 86, at 566.
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individuals or corporations responsible for human rights obligations are similarly
underdeveloped.319 IFIs eschew being bound by human rights duties or having
human rights conditionalities imposed on their loans.320
While EEL usually focuses on the obligations of nation-actors, many scholars
and activists argue that these same norms do, or should also apply to non-state
actors, including MNEs, IFIs, NGOs, and individuals. The U.N. has drawn up a
set of norms that would bind corporations to human rights responsibilities. 32' The
UN High Commissioner on Human Rights has recommended that corporations
be responsible for human rights violations within their "sphere of influence. 322
Such exhortations, however, are the softest of soft law. Usually it is up to home or
host states to regulate them within domestic frameworks.3 23
To transition to a sustainable, deeply equitable world, all actors should be
bound by the same principles of IHRL and IEL to which nation states are bound.
The foundation of all human rights is to protect and defend human "dignity.' '324 If
an actor - a state, private entity, NGO, or IFI - acts to threaten the fundamental
rights protected by IHRL mechanisms, that actor should assume duties to respect,
protect, and fulfill those rights. If a private actor violates a principle codified as
customary IEL, aggrieved parties (or their advocates) should have channels of
effective legal relief. As Dine asserts, "the greater the power that property rights
bestow, the greater the ensuing responsibilities. 325 Owning forest carbon may
mean owning the resources that make life possible for some communities; the
ensuing responsibilities are thus great.
Those negotiating the KP's successor should revisit IHRL and EEL to assert the
legal responsibilities of all actors who develop forest carbon projects and, indeed,
other CDM projects. Private actors who benefit under the treaty regime should
have corresponding responsibilities to respect the same international laws as
nation states. lIFIs that bankroll these projects, often to the benefit of private
actors, should also be held to the same legal standards. The COP must devise
clear rules, channels for grievances, fora to hear grievances, and effective
remedies for those marginalized people and communities who find themselves on
the losing end of projects without financial or institutional resources to defend
themselves.
Private actors working outside the international treaty regime should be legally
accountable to a rigorous, mandatory, uniform code of standards. Currently, it is
319. MucKuNsKi, supra note 86, at 536, 572.
320. LItCH ET.AL., supra note 208, at 397; DtNE, supra note 199, at 188.
321. U.N. Econ & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights, Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights,
para. 2, U.N. Doc. EJCN.4/sub.2/2003/l2/Rev.2 (Aug. 26,2003).
322. Id. par. 1.
323. DINE, supra note 199, at 42.
324. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 256, at pmbl,.
325. DiNE, supra note 199, at 279.
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unclear whether forest carbon project developers are liable if human rights
violations occur as a result of these investments. Do voluntary standards
contravene states' legal responsibilities to legislate and enforce their own
environmental and human rights laws? 326 Who will enforce the standards and
impose penalties if project developers don't deliver on their promises? 327 Will a
participating NGO invested in a project's biodiversity-enhancing or poverty-
alleviating benefits be able to advocate and critique objectively any prospective
damaging aspects of forest carbon projects? 328 Businesses aim to maximize
short-term economic value for their stakeholders: Will they apply voluntary
regulatory brakes that could threaten profits?
While I cannot answer these questions here, I do propose that we re-envision
the forest carbon project process by first naming the most deeply equitable set of
standards we can. All actors, whether private or treaty-based, investing in or
financing these projects would then be bound by those standards. In other words,
we should start with the laws and rules themselves, and then work backward to
design a legal apparatus that can enforce and adjudicate breaches in those laws
and rules. The prescriptions I have named here form my proposed start; designing
the legal apparatus awaits another day.
B. HOME STATES AS DUTY BEARERS
Nations bear the brunt of legal duties under IHRL and EEL. But in forest carbon
schemes, neither host country nor home country have much incentive or, in some
cases, adequate power to perform those duties. Northern countries have strong
incentives to fund forest carbon deals as a cheap way of buying the right to
pollute more at home, to please domestic private investors, and to promote
biodiversity preservation and thus please ecologically conscious citizens and
voters.329 Forest carbon projects offer inexpensive ways to offset required
emissions reductions under the Kyoto Protocol and its successors. Norway has
announced its plans to be "carbon neutral" by 2030, partly through investing
enormously in forest projects in developing nations, and pending U.S. legislation
would encourage REDD investments to offset mandatory emissions reduc-
tions. 330 At the same time, nations can help fulfill their commitments to the EU's
target that member states contribute 0.7% of GDP t6 Overseas Development
326. Morrison & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 86, at 526.
327. Morrison & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 86, at 524.
328. MucHLitsri, supra note 86, at 554-55.
329. Nelson, supra note 7, at 645; ERAKER, supra note 275, at 5, 21 (discussing cost effective emissions and
detailing entities that will profit); see Takacs, supra note 25, at 64-69 (describing some of these projects and
their national backers).
330. Elisabeth Rosenthal, Lofty Pledge to Cut Emissions Comes With Caveat in Norway, N.Y. TwEs, Mar.
22, 2008, at At; H.R. 2454, supra note 12.
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Assistance by 2015.331 When these commitments act qua nations, they are legally
bound to the strictures of these bodies of international law. McCorquodale &
Simons argue that further obligations exist: when MNEs violate IHRL, home
states are legally required to regulate them, including piercing the corporate veil
to see what subsidiaries acting extraterritorially are controlled by home state
parents.332
Using carbon credits to achieve GHG reduction goals may be an attractive
alternative to actullay cutting emissions. While citizens may be in favor of cutting
GHG emissions in theory, their support may wane when they see the effects on
their daily lives, such as higher taxes and fuel costs, curbs on where they can
drive and fly, and product bans. Elected officials, once they get the good press
that comes from being eco-friendly, will subsequently look for safety valves:
ways to cushion the blows that GHG emissions reductions may rain on their
citizens and their own political prospects. Northern leaders, who must curry favor
with private business to gain or stay in power, have little reason to regulate their
private industries' acquisition of Southern forests. Northern actors profit not just
through carbon offset trading but through associated business ventures.3 33
Northern national political leaders may thus be under strong pressure to help their
businesses find options that allow them to offset required carbon reductions in the
cheapest way possible while finding new and novel ways to reap other profits
from the scheme. These same leaders may curry favor with environmentalists by
overlooking possible IHRL violations that may accompany forest carbon projects
that emphasize biodiversity preservation at the expense of local community
needs.
Critics have labeled forest carbon schemes "CO21onialism," and allege that by
securing large tracts of Southern forests, Northern consumers and industries can
continue business as usual and need make no painful changes in lifestyle, or make
the difficult investments to transition to a post-hydrocarbon economy.334 Just as
in traditional colonialism, forest carbon investments may transfer wealth from
South to North. On the other hand, some investors may genuinely promote deep
equity, and may genuinely desire to help poor communities adapt to climate
change. Emerging voluntary standards such as those from CCB move in this
direction; but investments that violate principles of deep equity---or violate
331. Laurence Boisson De Chazournes, Technical and Financial Assistance, in THE OxFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRoNMENrAL LAW, supra note 43, at 951.
332. McCorquodale & Simons, supra note 206, at 615,617.
333. A World Bank Report notes that "the most successful deals were those that went beyond contracting for
carbon and included other relationships, viz. equity, debt, equipment sales, other commodity sales etc.... For
example, a London-based carbon company reported in its public filings that it had purchased an equity share in a
sugar company in Ethiopia. We expect such types of investment activity to continue and rapidly increase as
carbon becomes just one of the many assets from which investors seek to correctly value and grow." CAPOoR &
AMBROSI, supra note 99, at 25.
334. HuMPHREYs, supra note 8, at 208; LO mANN, supra note 8, at 344; ERAKER, supra note 275, at 12.
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international law-are unlikely to receive scrutiny from the home countries of
private investors.
C. HOST STATES AS DUTY BEARERS
International law is founded on the notion of sovereign equality, despite the
fact that all nations are not equal. In deep equity terms, some nations-mostly in
the North-possess resources that better allow them to fulfill their sovereign
goals. While Southern host states have legal duties to respect, protect, and fulfill
human rights for their people, that does not mean they have the financial and
institutional means to do so in the face of powerful Northern state and corporate
actors. All CDM projects need letters of approval from the host nation's DNA,
who has the prerogative to judge whether a forest carbon project meets the
nation's sustainable development goals. 335 But if DNAs assiduously follow their
nation's interests-say, by arguing that carbon should be sold for the best
possible price-the developer may well go elsewhere, and Southern nations may
engage in a race to the bottom to attract forest carbon investments.336
While human rights law requires Southern nations to supervise companies
acting in their territory, this has been a struggle for cash-strapped govern-
ments.337 Even where governments have pro-poor, pro-human rights legislation
or constitutional provisions, governments do not necessarily have the institu-
tional resources to realize those laws.33 8 Southern nations, where deforestation
produces the most GHG emissions, are also likely to have inadequate governance
capacity.339 Southern nations require institutional adaptation aid to adjudicate
complex carbon property rights,34 ° pierce corporate veils to trace responsibility,
formulate and conduct grievance procedures, monitor human rights, seek redress
for violations, and enforce "voluntary" standards. Moreover, forest carbon
projects demand rarefied technological calculations, and many communities or
nations simply lack the resources to do ecological or social assessments, and
335. Scholz & Jung, supra note 78, at 79; Locatelli et al., supra note 211, at 114.
336. Nelson, supra note 7, at 639; LotmANN, supra note 8, at 180-81; Swallow et al., supra note 140, at 9;
Ascui & Costa warn that "[iinterference by DNAs in pricing creates uncertainty.... The results will ultimately
be economically detrimental to the country, as investors will, ceteris paribus, look elsewhere for credits."
Francisco Ascui & Pedro Moura Costa, A Project Developer's Perspective: CER Pricing and Risk, in EQUAL
EXCHANGE, supra note 6, at 83.
337. MucHLuNsKi, supra note 86, at 536. See, e.g., Soc. and Econ. Rights Action Ctr. v. Nigeria, Comm. No.
155/96, paras. 46, 57, 58 (African Comm'n on Human and Peoples' Rights 2001) (holding that Nigeria failed to
protect the citizens of Ogoniland from various civil and political, economic, social, and cultural, and
environmental human rights violations committed by multinational oil companies).
338. Bracer et al., supra note 6, at 35.
339. Charlotte Streck et al., Creating Incentives for Avoiding Further Deforestation: The Nested Approach,
in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS: EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 2, at 240-41;
COTULA & MAYERS, supra note 8, at 7.
340. Miller et al., supra note 257, at 166; COTULA & MAYERS, supra note 6, at 13; See TAKACS, supra note 2,
at 49.
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therefore to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights.34 1 Supervising negotia-
tions, whether CDM or voluntary, and then enforcing the resulting contracts, is
342 iexpensive. What is more, voluntary market offsets, while hypothetically
required to respect host country laws, are often conducted directly between
developer and communities and may fly beneath the radar screen of the national
government.
Hungry for aid, Southern leaders have a strong incentive to assert that
reforestation or REDD projects were not planned, even if they were, leading to
the problem of false additionality. Perversely, this may lead Southern nations to
make sure their own environmental laws are not enforced, because they can
develop voluntary or CDM projects that generate CER cash just for obeying laws
already on the books.3 43 Governments own much of the forestland in the South,
and those forests could be a lucrative source of income for governments. Why
would they circumscribe what forest carbon actors can do?344 Furthermore,
Southern leaders may use forest carbon projects as a way to gain state control of
forestlands and their riches, where indigenous or other groups have held sway.345
Forest carbon projects may be captured by corrupt, elite, local and national
figures who wish to profit from forest carbon.3 46 Southern nations were institu-
tionally disadvantaged in international climate negotiations, so the legal appara-
tus and priorities have not been in their favor from the start.
347
D. EXTRATERRITORIALITY
In most forest carbon projects, developers from Northern nations invest in
forests in a distant Southern nation. This compounds the ability of state and
private actors to elude the weak clutches of international law. IHRL supposes that
each nation state is responsible for the human rights of its citizens. Some legal
scholars and activists promote the norm that human rights and environmental
responsibility ought not stop at national borders, and ground the norm in a
growing corpus of international law that suggests that nations are responsible for
promoting and not transgressing human rights across national borders.348 That is,
sovereignty should not, and does not preclude transboundary responsibility for
respecting, protecting, and fulfilling dignified lives for all Earth's citizens. In fact,
nations are denied sovereignty to control their own resources and to fulfill their
own mandated IHRL or IEL responsibilities if powerful private actors fomenting
341. Schwartz, supra note 295, at 470.
342. Ofosu-Ahenkorah, supra note 6, at 128; Locatelli et al., supra note 211, at 115.
343. LOHMANN, supra note 8, at 177-78.
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345. Giw~rrHs, supra note 8, at 5, 14.
346. Id. at 13; RoE Er A.., supra note 8, at 4.
347. Mace, supra note 34, at 5.
348. SKOGLY, supra note 201, at 3, 52,207-8; Meron, supra note 204, at 78, 81, 82.
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forest carbon projects undercut a government's ability to care for its people. Not
only ought states to control their own private actors that potentially undercut lives
and livelihoods across national borders; those private actors themselves ought to
carry human rights and environmental liability when they do so, whether or not
they are operating in their home country.
GHG emissions disperse globally, and thus liability, causation, and redress are
legally complicated for damages due to global climate change in general.349
However, this is not the case for forest carbon investments, where a discrete set of
actors operate in a discrete physical territory. Actors from a foreign nation should
meet legal constraints if they threaten to interfere with national sovereignty,
undermining the legal rights and responsibilities of a nation to control its territory
and protect its people.
V. CONCLUSION
Forest project investments can contribute to a deeply equitable world. An
individual who is economically more secure, whose land tenure is recognized,
who has learned new trades and skills, is one whose socioeconomic adaptation to
global climate change has been abetted by such investments. A community is
more secure and can realize its potential if its individuals' potentials are realized,
if it gains infrastructure and has strengthened governance institutions from
proposing, negotiating, managing, and monitoring its own projects. An ecosystem
is more secure if its full sustainable value is realized by the people who depend on
it as the ultimate source of all life and livelihood, and who ultimately must protect
it if it is to provide services locally and globally.
An international legal system adequate to regulate forest carbon and to
promote deep equity would ensure that projects disproportionately benefit poor
people, communities, and nations. Forest carbon projects would foment genuine
socioeconomic, ecological, and institutional adaptation in those countries. An
ideal, law-abiding, deeply equitable forest carbon project protects or restores
healthy forests. Local people gain disproportionately more wealth compared to
Northern ihvestors as a result. Local communities instigate the project; if not,
they are not merely consulted, but are full and equal partners, with honest brokers
assisting them in negotiations, and full and transparent domestic and interna-
tional grievance processes. Treaty-based offsets are only permitted once a
polluting nation or entity has made deep cuts in both GHG emissions and demand
for forest products;,offsets would not implicitly legitimate pollution or overcon-
sumption.
Voluntary standards would be enforceable and enforced. Human rights bodies
would have legal teeth. Polluters would be fined to help the victims of their
349. Aminzadeh, supra note 76, at 240-41.
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pollution adapt. CBDR would require genuine reductions in Northern carbon
emissions accompanied with transfusions of adaptation aid - cash, clean technolo-
gies, and reforestation/REDD assistance to communities on the losing end of
GHG pollution. NGOs and other honest brokers would act as ombudspersons to
represent those lacking means. Private actors would be directly responsible for
human rights or IEL violations, in whatever territory they occurred, as would the
home and host nations who ought to be supervising them due to their own
responsibilities to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights. Local, national, and
international legal organs would hear grievances and mete out appropriate
remedies when legal norms are violated. Local people would be empowered to
stop any project that violated their human rights or principles of domestic or
international environmental law. In fact, they would spearhead and profit from
any forest carbon project that would further healthy individuals, communities,
and ecosystems.
